


NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                             L. Zhu
Internet-Draft                                             K. Jaganathan
Expires: November 21, 2005                         Microsoft Corporation
                                                             N. Williams
                                                        Sun Microsystems
                                                            May 20, 2005


                        OCSP Support for PKINIT
                   draft-ietf-krb-wg-ocsp-for-pkinit-05

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 3 of RFC 3667. 
   
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document defines a mechanism to enable in-band transmission of
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses in the Kerberos
   network authentication protocol.  These responses are used to verify
   the validity of the certificates used in PKINIT - the Kerberos



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   Version 5 extension that provides for the use of public key
   cryptography.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Message Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     7.1   Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     7.2   Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . .  7



































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1.  Introduction

   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] enables
   applications to obtain timely information regarding the revocation
   status of a certificate.  Because OCSP responses are well-bounded and
   small in size, constrained clients may wish to use OCSP to check the
   validity of the certificates for Kerberos Key Distribution Center
   (KDC) in order to avoid transmission of large Certificate Revocation
   Lists (CRLs) and therefore save bandwidth on constrained networks
   [OCSP-PROFILE].

   This document defines a pre-authentication type [CLARIFICATIONS],
   where the client and the KDC MAY piggyback OCSP responses for
   certificates used in authentication exchanges, as defined in
   [PKINIT].

   By using this OPTIONAL extension, PKINIT clients and the KDC can
   maximize the reuse of cached OCSP responses.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Message Definition

   A pre-authentication type identifier is defined for this mechanism:

              PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE              18

   The corresponding padata-value field [CLARIFICATIONS] contains the
   DER [X60] encoding of the following ASN.1 type:

          PKOcspData ::= SEQUENCE OF OcspResponse
                         -- If more than one OcspResponse is
                         -- included, the first OcspResponse
                         -- MUST contain the OCSP response
                         -- for the signer's certificate.

          OcspResponse ::= OCTET STRING
                         -- Contains a complete OCSP response,
                         -- as defined in [RFC2560].

   The client MAY send OCSP responses for certificates used in PA-PK-AS-
   REQ [PKINIT] via a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE.

   The KDC that receives a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE then SHOULD send a PA-PK-



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   OCSP-RESPONSE containing OCSP responses for certificates used in the
   KDC's PA-PK-AS-REP.  The client can request a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE by
   using a PKOcspData containing an empty sequence.

   The KDC MAY send a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE when it does not receive a PA-
   PK-OCSP-RESPONSE from the client.

   The PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE sent by the KDC contains OCSP responses for
   certificates used in PA-PK-AS-REP [PKINIT].

   Note the lack of integrity protection for the empty or missing OCSP
   response; lack of an expected OCSP response from the KDC for the
   KDC's certificates SHOULD be treated as an error by the client,
   unless it is configured otherwise.

   When using OCSP, the response is signed by the OCSP server, which is
   trusted by the receiver.  Depending on local policy, further
   verification of the validity of the OCSP servers may be needed

   The client and the KDC SHOULD ignore invalid OCSP responses received
   via this mechanism, and they MAY implement CRL processing logic as a
   fall-back position, if the OCSP responses received via this mechanism
   alone are not sufficient for the verification of certificate
   validity.  The client and/or the KDC MAY ignore a valid OCSP response
   and perform their own revocation status verification independently.

4.  Security Considerations

   The pre-authentication data in this document do not actually
   authenticate any principals, but is designed to be used in
   conjunction with PKINIT.

   There is no binding between PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication
   data and PKINIT pre-authentication data other than a given OCSP
   response corresponding to a certificate used in a PKINIT pre-
   authentication data element.  Attacks involving removal or
   replacement of PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication data elements
   are, at worst, downgrade attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC would
   proceed without use of CRLs or OCSP for certificate validation, or
   denial of service attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC that cannot
   validate the other's certificate without an accompanying OCSP
   response might reject the AS exchange or where they might have to
   download very large CRLs in order to continue.  Kerberos V does not
   protect against denial-of-service attacks, therefore the denial-of-
   service aspect of these attacks are acceptable.

   If a PKINIT client or KDC cannot validate certificates without the
   aid of a valid PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE then it SHOULD fail the AS



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   exchange, possibly according to local configuration.

5.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA actions are required for this document.

6.  Acknowledgements

   This document was based on conversations among the authors, Jeffrey
   Altman, Sam Hartman, Martin Rex and other members of the Kerberos
   working group.

7.  References

7.1  Normative References

   [CLARIFICATIONS]
              RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-
              krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications.  Work in Progress. 

   [PKINIT]   RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-
              cat-kerberos-pk-init.  Work in Progress. 

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2560]  Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C.
              Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
              Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.

   [X690]     ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding 
              Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and 
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T Recommendation 
              X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC International Standard 8825-1:1998.

7.2  Informative References

   [OCSP-PROFILE]
              RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-deacon-
              lightweight-ocsp-profile.  Work in Progress.  















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Authors' Addresses

   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: lzhu@microsoft.com


   Karthik Jaganathan
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: karthikj@microsoft.com


   Nicolas Williams
   Sun Microsystems
   5300 Riata Trace Ct
   Austin, TX  78727
   US

   Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
























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Acknowledgment

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   Internet Society.




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