





Network Working Group                                     M. Steenstrup
Request for Comments: 1479                 BBN Systems and Technologies
                                                              July 1993


     Inter-Domain Policy Routing Protocol Specification: Version 1

Status of this Memo

   This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
   community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
   Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
   Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   We present the set of protocols and procedures that constitute
   Inter-Domain Policy Routing (IDPR).  IDPR includes the virtual
   gateway protocol, the flooding protocol, the route server query
   protocol, the route generation procedure, the path control protocol,
   and the data message forwarding procedure.

Contributors

   The following people have contributed to the protocols and procedures
   described in this document: Helen Bowns, Lee Breslau, Ken Carlberg,
   Isidro Castineyra, Deborah Estrin, Tony Li, Mike Little, Katia
   Obraczka, Sam Resheff, Martha Steenstrup, Gene Tsudik, and Robert
   Woodburn.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   1.1. Domain Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   1.2. Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   1.3. IDPR Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   1.3.1. IDPR Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   1.4. Policy Semantics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   1.4.1. Source Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   1.4.2. Transit Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   1.5. IDPR Message Encapsulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   1.5.1. IDPR Data Message Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
   1.6. Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
   1.7. Timestamps and Clock Synchronization. . . . . . . . . . . . .13
   1.8. Network Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
   1.8.1. Policy Gateway Configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
   1.8.2. Route Server Configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18



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   2. Control Message Transport Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
   2.1. Message Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
   2.2. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
   2.3. Message Validation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
   2.4. CMTP Message Formats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
   3. Virtual Gateway Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
   3.1. Message Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
   3.1.1. Pair-PG Messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
   3.1.2. Intra-VG Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
   3.1.3. Inter-VG Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
   3.1.4. VG Representatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
   3.2. Up/Down Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
   3.3. Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
   3.4. Policy Gateway Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
   3.4.1. Within a Virtual Gateway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
   3.4.2. Between Virtual Gateways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
   3.4.3. Communication Complexity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
   3.5. VGP Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
   3.5.1. UP/DOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
   3.5.2. PG CONNECT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
   3.5.3. PG POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
   3.5.4. VG CONNECT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
   3.5.5. VG POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
   3.5.6. Negative Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
   4. Routing Information Distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
   4.1. AD Representatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
   4.2. Flooding Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
   4.2.1. Message Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
   4.2.2. Sequence Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
   4.2.3. Message Acceptance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
   4.2.4. Message Incorporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
   4.2.5. Routing Information Database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
   4.3. Routing Information Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
   4.3.1. CONFIGURATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
   4.3.2. DYNAMIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
   4.3.3. Negative Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
   5. Route Server Query Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
   5.1. Message Exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
   5.2. Remote Route Server Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
   5.3. Routing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
   5.4. Routes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
   5.5. Route Server Message Formats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
   5.5.1. ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
   5.5.2. ROUTE REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
   5.5.3. ROUTE RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
   5.5.4. Negative Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
   6. Route Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
   6.1. Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74



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   6.1.1. Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
   6.2. Route Directionality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
   6.3. Route Database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
   6.3.1. Cache Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
   7. Path Control Protocol and Data Message Forwarding Procedure . .80
   7.1. An Example of Path Setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81
   7.2. Path Identifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
   7.3. Path Control Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
   7.4. Setting Up and Tearing Down a Path. . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
   7.4.1. Validating Path Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
   7.4.2. Path Consistency with Configured Transit Policies . . . . .89
   7.4.3. Path Consistency with Virtual Gateway Reachability. . . . .91
   7.4.4. Obtaining Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
   7.4.5. Target Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
   7.4.6. Originator Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
   7.4.7. Path Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
   7.5. Path Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
   7.5.1. Handling Implicit Path Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
   7.5.2. Local Path Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  97
   7.5.3. Repairing a Path. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
   7.6. Path Control Message Formats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
   7.6.1. SETUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
   7.6.2. ACCEPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
   7.6.3. REFUSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
   7.6.4. TEARDOWN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
   7.6.5. ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
   7.6.6. REPAIR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
   7.6.7. Negative Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
   8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
   9. Authors's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

1.  Introduction

   In this document, we specify the protocols and procedures that
   compose Inter-Domain Policy Routing (IDPR).  The objective of IDPR is
   to construct and maintain routes between source and destination
   administrative domains, that provide user traffic with the services
   requested within the constraints stipulated for the domains
   transited.  IDPR supports link state routing information distribution
   and route generation in conjunction with source specified message
   forwarding.  Refer to [5] for a detailed justification of our
   approach to inter-domain policy routing.

1.1.  Domain Elements

   The IDPR architecture has been designed to accommodate an
   internetwork with tens of thousands of administrative domains



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   collectively containing hundreds of thousands of local networks.
   Inter-domain policy routes are constructed using information about
   the services offered by, and the connectivity between, administrative
   domains.  The intra-domain details - gateways, networks, and links
   traversed - of an inter-domain policy route are the responsibility of
   intra-domain routing and are thus outside the scope of IDPR.

   An "administrative domain" (AD) is a collection of contiguous hosts,
   gateways, networks, and links managed by a single administrative
   authority.  The domain administrator defines service restrictions for
   transit traffic and service requirements for locally-generated
   traffic, and selects the addressing schemes and routing procedures
   that apply within the domain.  Within the Internet, each domain has a
   unique numeric identifier assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA).

   "Virtual gateways" (VGs) are the only IDPR-recognized connecting
   points between adjacent domains.  Each virtual gateway is a
   collection of directly-connected "policy gateways" (see below) in two
   adjoining domains, whose existence has been sanctioned by the
   administrators of both domains.  The domain administrators may agree
   to establish more than one virtual gateway between the two domains.
   For each such virtual gateway, the two administrators together assign
   a local numeric identifier, unique within the set of virtual gateways
   connecting the two domains.  To produce a virtual gateway identifier
   unique within its domain, a domain administrator concatenates the
   mutually assigned local virtual gateway identifier together with the
   adjacent domain's identifier.

   Policy gateways (PGs) are the physical gateways within a virtual
   gateway.  Each policy gateway enforces service restrictions on IDPR
   transit traffic, as stipulated by the domain administrator, and
   forwards the traffic accordingly.  Within a domain, two policy
   gateways are "neighbors" if they are in different virtual gateways.
   A single policy gateway may belong to multiple virtual gateways.
   Within a virtual gateway, two policy gateways are "peers" if they are
   in the same domain and are "adjacent" if they are in different
   domains.  Adjacent policy gateways are "directly connected" if the
   only Internet-addressable entities attached to the connecting medium
   are policy gateways in the virtual gateways.  Note that this
   definition implies that not only point-to-point links but also
   networks may serve as direct connections between adjacent policy
   gateways.  The domain administrator assigns to each of its policy
   gateways a numeric identifier, unique within that domain.

   A "domain component" is a subset of a domain's entities such that all
   entities within the subset are mutually reachable via intra-domain
   routes, but no entities outside the subset are reachable via intra-



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   domain routes from entities within the subset.  Normally, a domain
   consists of a single component, namely itself; however, when
   partitioned, a domain consists of multiple components.  Each domain
   component has an identifier, unique within the Internet, composed of
   the domain identifier together with the identifier of the lowest-
   numbered operational policy gateway within the component.  All
   operational policy gateways within a domain component can discover
   mutual reachability through intra-domain routing information.  Hence,
   all such policy gateways can consistently determine, without explicit
   negotiation, which of them has the lowest number.

1.2.  Policy

   With IDPR, each domain administrator sets "transit policies" that
   dictate how and by whom the resources in its domain should be used.
   Transit policies are usually public, and they specify offered
   services comprising:

   -   Access restrictions: e.g., applied to traffic to or from certain
       domains or classes of users.

   -   Quality: e.g., delay, throughput, or error characteristics.

   -   Monetary cost: e.g., charge per byte, message, or unit time.

   Each domain administrator also sets "source policies" for traffic
   originating in its domain.  Source policies are usually private, and
   they specify requested services comprising:

   -   Access restrictions: e.g., domains to favor or avoid in routes.

   -   Quality: e.g., acceptable delay, throughput, and reliability.

   -   Monetary cost: e.g., acceptable session cost.

1.3.  IDPR Functions

   IDPR comprises the following functions:

   -   Collecting and distributing routing information including domain
       transit policies and inter-domain connectivity.

   -   Generating and selecting policy routes based on the routing
       information distributed and on the source policies configured or
       requested.

   -   Setting up paths across the Internet using the policy routes
       generated.



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   -   Forwarding messages across and between domains along the
       established paths.

   -   Maintaining databases of routing information, inter-domain policy
       routes, forwarding information, and configuration information.

1.3.1.  IDPR Entities

   Several different entities are responsible for performing the IDPR
   functions.

   Policy gateways, the only IDPR-recognized connecting points between
   adjacent domains, collect and distribute routing information,
   participate in path setup, forward data messages along established
   paths, and maintain forwarding information databases.

   "Path agents", resident within policy gateways and within "route
   servers" (see below), act on behalf of hosts to select policy routes,
   to set up and manage paths, and to maintain forwarding information
   databases.  Any Internet host can reap the benefits of IDPR, as long
   as there exists a path agent configured to act on its behalf and a
   means by which the host's messages can reach the path agent.
   Specifically, a path agent in one domain may be configured to act on
   behalf of hosts in another domain.  In this case, the path agent's
   domain is an IDPR "proxy" for the hosts' domain.

   Route servers maintain both the routing information database and the
   route database, and they generate policy routes using the routing
   information collected and the source policies requested by the path
   agents.  A route server may reside within a policy gateway, or it may
   exist as an autonomous entity.  Separating the route server functions
   from the policy gateways frees the policy gateways from both the
   memory intensive task of database (routing information and route)
   maintenance and the computationally intensive task of route
   generation.  Route servers, like policy gateways, each have a unique
   numeric identifier within their domain, assigned by the domain
   administrator.

   Given the size of the current Internet, each policy gateway can
   perform the route server functions, in addition to its message
   forwarding functions, with little or no degradation in message
   forwarding performance.  Aggregating the routing functions into
   policy gateways simplifies implementation; one need only install IDPR
   protocols in policy gateways.  Moreover, it simplifies communication
   between routing functions, as all functions reside within each policy
   gateway.  As the Internet grows, the memory and processing required
   to perform the route server functions may become a burden for the
   policy gateways.  When this happens, each domain administrator should



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   separate the route server functions from the policy gateways in its
   domain.

   "Mapping servers" maintain the database of mappings that resolve
   Internet names and addresses to domain identifiers.  Each host is
   contained within a domain and is associated with a proxy domain which
   may be identical with the host's domain.  The mapping server function
   will be integrated into the existing DNS name service (see [6]) and
   will provide mappings between a host and its local and proxy domains.

   "Configuration servers" maintain the databases of configured
   information that apply to IDPR entities within their domains.
   Configuration information for a given domain includes transit
   policies (i.e., service offerings and restrictions), source policies
   (i.e., service requirements), and mappings between local IDPR
   entities and their names and addresses.  The configuration server
   function will be integrated into a domain's existing network
   management system (see [7]-[8]).

1.4.  Policy Semantics

   The source and transit policies supported by IDPR are intended to
   accommodate a wide range of services available throughout the
   Internet.  We describe the semantics of these policies, concentrating
   on the access restriction aspects.  To express these policies in this
   document, we have chosen to use a syntactic variant of Clark's policy
   term notation [1].  However, we provide a more succinct syntax (see
   [7]) for actually configuring source and transit policies.

1.4.1.  Source Policies

   Each source policy takes the form of a collection of sets as follows:

   Applicable Sources and Destinations:
      {((H(1,1),s(1,1)),...,(H(1,f1),s(1,f1))),...,((H(n,1),s(n,1)),...,
      (H(n,fn),s(n,fn)))}: The set of groups of source/destination
      traffic flows to which the source policy applies.  Each traffic
      flow group ((H(i,1),s(i,1)),...,(H(i,fi),s(i,fi))) contains a set
      of source hosts and corresponding destination hosts.  Here, H(i,j)
      represents a host, and s(i,j), an element of {SOURCE,
      DESTINATION}, represents an indicator of whether H(i,j) is to be
      considered as a source or as a destination.

   Domain Preferences: {(AD(1),x(1)),...,(AD(m),x(m))}: The set of
      transit domains that the traffic flows should favor, avoid, or
      exclude.  Here, AD(i) represents a domain, and x(i), an element of
      {FAVOR, AVOID, EXCLUDE}, represents an indicator of whether routes
      including AD(i) are to be favored, avoided if possible, or



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      unconditionally excluded.

   UCI: The source user class for the traffic flows listed.

   RequestedServices: The set of requested services not related to
      access restrictions, i.e., service quality and monetary cost.

   When selecting a route for a traffic flow from a source host H(i,j)
   to a destination host H(i,k), where 1 < or = i < or = n and 1 < or =
   j, k < or = fi, the path agent (see section 1.3.1) must honor the
   source policy such that:

   - For each domain, AD(p), contained in the route, AD(p) is not equal
     to any AD(k), such that 1 < or = k < or = m and x(k) = EXCLUDE.

   - The route provides the services listed in the set Requested
     Services.

1.4.2.  Transit Policies

   Each transit policy takes the form of a collection of sets as
   follows:

   Source/Destination Access Restrictions:
      {((H(1,1),AD(1,1),s(1,1)),...,(H(1,f1),AD(1,f1),s(1,f1))),...,
      ((H(n,1),AD(n,1),s(n,1)),...,(H(n,fn),AD(n,fn),s(n,fn)))}: The set
      of groups of source and destination hosts and domains to which the
      transit policy applies.  Each domain group
      ((H(i,1),AD(i,1),s(i,1)),...,(H(i,fi),AD(i,fi),s(i,fi))) contains
      a set of source and destination hosts and domains such that this
      transit domain will carry traffic from each source listed to each
      destination listed.  Here, H(i,j) represents a set of hosts,
      AD(i,j) represents a domain containing H(i,j), and s(i,j), a
      subset of {SOURCE, DESTINATION}, represents an indicator of
      whether (H(i,j),AD(i,j)) is to be considered as a set of sources,
      destinations, or both.

   Temporal Access Restrictions: The set of time intervals during which
      the transit policy applies.

   User Class Access Restrictions: The set of user classes to which the
      transit policy applies.

   Offered Services: The set of offered services not related to access
      restrictions, i.e., service quality and monetary cost.






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   Virtual Gateway Access Restrictions:
      {((VG(1,1),e(1,1)),...,(VG(1,g1),e(1,g1))),...,((VG(m,1),e(m,1)),
      gateways to which the transit policy applies.  Each virtual
      gateway group ((VG(i,1),e(i,1)),...,(VG(i,gi),e(i,gi))) contains a
      set of domain entry and exit points such that each entry virtual
      gateway can reach (barring an intra-domain routing failure) each
      exit virtual gateway via an intra-domain route supporting the
      transit policy.  Here, VG(i,j) represents a virtual gateway, and
      e(i,j), a subset of {ENTRY, EXIT}, represents an indicator of
      whether VG(i,j) is to be considered as a domain entry point, exit
      point, or both.

   The domain advertising such a transit policy will carry traffic from
   any host in the set H(i,j) in AD(i,j) to any host in the set H(i,k)
   in AD(i,k), where 1 < or = i < or = n and 1 < or = j, k < or = fi,
   provided that:

   - SOURCE is an element of s(i,j).

   - DESTINATION is an element of s(i,k).

   - Traffic from H(i,j) enters the domain during one of the intervals
     in the set Temporal Access Restrictions.

   - Traffic from H(i,j) carries one of the user class identifiers in
     the set User Class Access Restrictions.

   - Traffic from H(i,j) enters via any VG(u,v) such that ENTRY is an
     element of e(u,v), where 1 < or = u < or = m and 1 < or = v < or =
     gu.

   - Traffic to H(i,k) leaves via any VG(u,w) such that EXIT is an
     element of e(u,w), where 1 < or = w < or = gu.

1.5.  IDPR Message Encapsulation

   There are two kinds of IDPR messages:

   - "Data messages" containing user data generated by hosts.

   - "Control messages" containing IDPR protocol-related control
     information generated by policy gateways and route servers.

   Within an internetwork, only policy gateways and route servers are
   able to generate, recognize, and process IDPR messages.  The
   existence of IDPR is invisible to all other gateways and hosts,
   including mapping servers and configuration servers.  Mapping servers
   and configuration servers perform necessary but ancillary functions



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   for IDPR, and thus they are not required to handle IDPR messages.

   An IDPR entity places IDPR-specific information in each IDPR control
   message it originates; this information is significant only to
   recipient IDPR entities.  Using "encapsulation" across each domain,
   an IDPR message tunnels from source to destination across an
   internetwork through domains that may employ disparate intra-domain
   addressing schemes and routing procedures.

   As an alternative to encapsulation, we had considered embedding IDPR
   in IP, as a set of IP options.  However, this approach has the
   following disadvantages:

   - Only domains that support IP would be able to participate in IDPR;
     domains that do not support IP would be excluded.

   - Each gateway, policy or other, in a participating domain would at
     least have to recognize the IDPR option, even if it did not execute
     the IDPR protocols.  However, most commercial routers are not
     optimized for IP options processing, and so IDPR message handling
     might require significant processing at each gateway.

   - For some IDPR protocols, in particular path control, the size
     restrictions on IP options would preclude inclusion of all of the
     necessary protocol-related information.

   For these reasons, we decided against the IP option approach and in
   favor of encapsulation.

   An IDPR message travels from source to destination between
   consecutive policy gateways.  Each policy gateway encapsulates the
   IDPR message with information, for example an IP header, that will
   enable the message to reach the next policy gateway.  Note that the
   encapsulating header and the IDPR-specific information may increase
   the message size beyond the MTU of the given domain.  However,
   message fragmentation and reassembly is the responsibility of the
   protocol, for example IP, that encapsulates IDPR messages for
   transport between successive policy gateways; it is not currently the
   responsibility of IDPR itself.

   A policy gateway, when forwarding an IDPR message to a peer or a
   neighbor policy gateway, encapsulates the message in accordance with
   the addressing scheme and routing procedure of the given domain and
   indicates in the protocol field of the encapsulating header that the
   message is indeed an IDPR message.  Intermediate gateways between the
   two policy gateways forward the IDPR message as they would any other
   message, using the information in the encapsulating header.  Only the
   recipient policy gateway interprets the protocol field, strips off



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RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993


   the encapsulating header, and processes the IDPR message.

   A policy gateway, when forwarding an IDPR message to a directly-
   connected adjacent policy gateway, encapsulates the message in
   accordance with the addressing scheme of the entities within the
   virtual gateway and indicates in the protocol field of the
   encapsulating header that the message is indeed an IDPR message.  The
   recipient policy gateway strips off the encapsulating header and
   processes the IDPR message.  We recommend that the recipient policy
   gateway perform the following validation check of the encapsulating
   header, prior to stripping it off.  Specifically, the recipient
   policy gateway should verify that the source address and the
   destination address in the encapsulating header match the adjacent
   policy gateway's address and its own address, respectively.
   Moreover, the recipient policy gateway should verify that the message
   arrived on the interface designated for the direct connection to the
   adjacent policy gateway.  These checks help to ensure that IDPR
   traffic that crosses domain boundaries does so only over direct
   connections between adjacent policy gateways.

   Policy gateways forward IDPR data messages according to a forwarding
   information database which maps "path identifiers", carried in the
   data messages, into next policy gateways.  Policy gateways forward
   IDPR control messages according to next policy gateways selected by
   the particular IDPR control protocols associated with the messages.
   Distinguishing IDPR data messages and IDPR control messages at the
   encapsulating protocol level, instead of at the IDPR protocol level,
   eliminates an extra level of dispatching and hence makes IDPR message
   forwarding more efficient.  When encapsulated within IP messages,
   IDPR data messages and IDPR control messages carry the IP protocol
   numbers 35 and 38, respectively.

1.5.1.  IDPR Data Message Format

   The path agents at a source domain determine which data messages
   generated by local hosts are to be handled by IDPR.  To each data
   message selected for IDPR handling, a source path agent prepends the
   following header:













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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    VERSION    |     PROTO     |            LENGTH             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                           TIMESTAMP                           |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            INT/AUTH                           |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+

   VERSION (8 bits) Version number for IDPR data messages, currently
   equal to 1.

   PROTO (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the protocol with which to
   process the contents of the IDPR data message.  Only the path agent
   at the destination interprets and acts upon the contents of the PROTO
   field.

   LENGTH (16 bits) Length of the entire IDPR data message in bytes.

   PATH ID (64 bits) Path identifier assigned by the source's path agent
   and consisting of the numeric identifier for the path agent's domain
   (16 bits), the numeric identifier for the path agent's policy gateway
   (16 bits), and the path agent's local path identifier (32 bits) (see
   section 7.2).

   TIMESTAMP (32 bits) Number of seconds elapsed since 1 January 1970
   0:00 GMT.

   INT/AUTH (variable) Computed integrity/authentication value,
   dependent on the type of integrity/authentication requested during
   path setup.

   We describe the IDPR control message header in section 2.4.

1.6.  Security

   IDPR contains mechanisms for verifying message integrity and source
   authenticity and for protecting against certain types of denial of
   service attacks.  It is particularly important to keep IDPR control
   messages intact, because they carry control information critical to
   the construction and use of viable policy routes between domains.

   All IDPR messages carry a single piece of information, referred to as



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   the "integrity/authentication value", which may be used not only to
   detect message corruption but also to verify the authenticity of the
   message source.  In the Internet, the IANA will sanction the set of
   valid algorithms which may be used to compute the
   integrity/authentication values.  This set may include algorithms
   that perform only message integrity checks such as n-bit cyclic
   redundancy checksums (CRCs), as well as algorithms that perform both
   message integrity and source authentication checks such as signed
   hash functions of message contents.

   Each domain administrator is free to select any
   integrity/authentication algorithm, from the set specified by the
   IANA, for computing the integrity/authentication values contained in
   its domain's messages.  However, we recommend that IDPR entities in
   each domain be capable of executing all of the valid algorithms so
   that an IDPR control message originating at an entity in one domain
   can be properly checked by an entity in another domain.

   Each IDPR control message must carry a non-null
   integrity/authentication value.  We recommend that control message
   integrity/authentication be based on a digital signature algorithm
   applied to a one-way hash function, such as RSA applied to MD5 [17],
   which simultaneously verifies message integrity and source
   authenticity.  The digital signature may be based on either public-
   key or private-key cryptography.  Our approach to digital signature
   use in IDPR is based on the privacy-enhanced Internet electronic mail
   service [13]-[15], already available in the Internet.

   We do not require that IDPR data messages carry a non-null
   integrity/authentication value.  In fact, we recommend that a higher
   layer (end-to-end) procedure, and not IDPR, assume responsibility for
   checking the integrity and authenticity of data messages, because of
   the amount of computation involved.

1.7.  Timestamps and Clock Synchronization

   Each IDPR message carries a timestamp (expressed in seconds elapsed
   since 1 January 1970 0:00 GMT, following the UNIX precedent) supplied
   by the source IDPR entity, which serves to indicate the age of the
   message.  IDPR entities use the absolute value of the timestamp to
   confirm that a message is current and use the relative difference
   between timestamps to determine which message contains the more
   recent information.

   All IDPR entities must possess internal clocks that are synchronized
   to some degree, in order for the absolute value of a message
   timestamp to be meaningful.  The synchronization granularity required
   by IDPR is on the order of minutes and can be achieved manually.



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   Thus, a clock synchronization protocol operating among all IDPR
   entities in all domains, while useful, is not necessary.

   An IDPR entity can determine whether to accept or reject a message
   based on the discrepancy between the message's timestamp and the
   entity's own internal clock time.  Any IDPR message whose timestamp
   lies outside of the acceptable range may contain stale or corrupted
   information or may have been issued by a source whose internal clock
   has lost synchronization with the message recipient's internal clock.
   Timestamp checks are required for control messages because of the
   consequences of propagating and acting upon incorrect control
   information.  However, timestamp checks are discretionary for data
   messages but may be invoked during problem diagnosis, for example,
   when checking for suspected message replays.

   We note that none of the IDPR protocols contain explicit provisions
   for dealing with an exhausted timestamp space.  As timestamp space
   exhaustion will not occur until well into the next century, we expect
   timestamp space viability to outlast the IDPR protocols.

1.8.  Network Management

   In this document, we do not describe how to configure and manage
   IDPR.  However, in this section, we do provide a list of the types of
   IDPR configuration information required.  Also, in later sections
   describing the IDPR protocols, we briefly note the types of
   exceptional events that must be logged for network management.
   Complete descriptions of IDPR entity configuration and IDPR managed
   objects appear in [7] and [8] respectively.

   To participate in inter-domain policy routing, policy gateways and
   route servers within a domain each require configuration information.
   Some of the configuration information is specifically defined within
   the given domain, while some of the configuration information is
   universally defined throughout an internetwork.  A domain
   administrator determines domain-specific information, and in the
   Internet, the IANA determines globally significant information.

   To produce valid domain configurations, the domain administrators
   must receive the following global information from the IANA:

   - For each integrity/authentication type, the numeric
     identifier, syntax, and semantics.  Available integrity and
     authentication types include but are not limited to:

       o    public-key based signatures;

       o    private-key based signatures;



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RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993



       o    cyclic redundancy checksums;

       o    no integrity/authentication.

   - For each user class, the numeric identifier, syntax, and
     semantics.  Available user classes include but are not limited to:

       o    federal (and if necessary, agency-specific such as NSF, DOD,
            DOE, etc.);

       o    research;

       o    commercial;

       o    support.

   - For each offered service that may be advertised in transit
     policies, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.  Available
     offered services include but are not limited to:

       o    average message delay;

       o    message delay variation;

       o    average bandwidth available;

       o    available bandwidth variation;

       o    maximum transfer unit (MTU);

       o    charge per byte;

       o    charge per message;

       o    charge per unit time.

   - For each access restriction that may be advertised in transit
     policies, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.  Available
     access restrictions include but are not limited to:

       o    Source and destination domains and host sets.

       o    User classes.

       o    Entry and exit virtual gateways.

       o    Time of day.



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   - For each requested service that may appear within a path setup
     message, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.  Available
     requested services include but are not limited to:

       o    maximum path life in minutes, messages, or bytes;

       o    integrity/authentication algorithms to be used on data
            messages sent over the path;

       o    upper bound on path delay;

       o    minimum delay path;

       o    upper bound on path delay variation;

       o    minimum delay variation path;

       o    lower bound on path bandwidth;

       o    maximum bandwidth path;

       o    upper bound on monetary cost;

       o    minimum monetary cost path.

   In an internetwork-wide implementation of IDPR, the set of global
   configuration parameters and their syntax and semantics must be
   consistent across all participating domains.  The IANA, responsible
   for establishing the full set of global configuration parameters in
   the Internet, relies on the cooperation of the administrators of all
   participating domains to ensure that the global parameters are
   consistent with the desired transit policies and user service
   requirements of each domain.  Moreover, as the syntax and semantics
   of the global parameters affects the syntax and semantics of the
   corresponding IDPR software, the IANA must carefully define each
   global parameter so that it is unlikely to require future
   modification.

   The IANA provides configured global information to configuration
   servers in all domains participating in IDPR.  Each domain
   administrator uses the configured global information maintained by
   its configuration servers to develop configurations for each IDPR
   entity within its domain.  Each configuration server retains a copy
   of the configuration for each local IDPR entity and also distributes
   the configuration to that entity using, for example, SNMP.






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RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993


1.8.1.  Policy Gateway Configuration

   Each policy gateway must contain sufficient configuration information
   to perform its IDPR functions, which subsume those of the path agent.
   These include: validating IDPR control messages; generating and
   distributing virtual gateway connectivity and routing information
   messages to peer, neighbor, and adjacent policy gateways;
   distributing routing information messages to route servers in its
   domain; resolving destination addresses; requesting policy routes
   from route servers; selecting policy routes and initiating path
   setup; ensuring consistency of a path with its domain's transit
   policies; establishing path forwarding information; and forwarding
   IDPR data messages along existing paths.  The necessary configuration
   information includes the following:

   - For each integrity/authentication type, the numeric identifier,
     syntax, and semantics.

   - For each policy gateway and route server in the given domain, the
     numeric identifier and set of addresses or names.

   - For each virtual gateway connected to the given domain, the numeric
     identifier, the numeric identifiers for the constituent peer policy
     gateways, and the numeric identifier for the adjacent domain.

   - For each virtual gateway of which the given policy gateway is a
     member, the numeric identifiers and set of addresses for the
     constituent adjacent policy gateways.

   - For each policy gateway directly-connected and adjacent to the
     given policy gateway, the local connecting interface.

   - For each local route server to which the given policy gateway
     distributes routing information, the numeric identifier.

   - For each source policy applicable to hosts within the given domain,
     the syntax and semantics.

   - For each transit policy applicable to the domain, the numeric
     identifier, syntax, and semantics.

   - For each requested service that may appear within a path setup
     message, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.

   - For each source user class, the numeric identifier, syntax, and
     semantics.





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1.8.2.  Route Server Configuration

   Each route server must contain sufficient configuration information
   to perform its IDPR functions, which subsume those of the path agent.
   These include: validating IDPR control messages; deciphering and
   storing the contents of routing information messages; exchanging
   routing information with other route servers and policy gateways;
   generating policy routes that respect transit policy restrictions and
   source service requirements; distributing policy routes to path
   agents in policy gateways; resolving destination addresses; selecting
   policy routes and initiating path setup; establishing path forwarding
   information; and forwarding IDPR data messages along existing paths.
   The necessary configuration information includes the following:

   - For each integrity/authentication type, the numeric identifier,
     syntax, and semantics.

   - For each policy gateway and route server in the given domain, the
     numeric identifier and set of addresses or names.

   - For each source policy applicable to hosts within the given domain,
     the syntax and semantics.

   - For access restriction that may be advertised in transit
     policies, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.

   - For each offered service that may be advertised in transit policies,
     the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.

   - For each requested service that may appear within a path setup
     message, the numeric identifier, syntax, and semantics.

   - For each source user class, the numeric identifier, syntax, and
     semantics.

2.  Control Message Transport Protocol

   IDPR control messages convey routing-related information that
   directly affects the policy routes generated and the paths set up
   across the Internet.  Errors in IDPR control messages can have
   widespread, deleterious effects on inter-domain policy routing, and
   so the IDPR protocols have been designed to minimize loss and
   corruption of control messages.  For every control message it
   transmits, each IDPR protocol expects to receive notification as to
   whether the control message successfully reached the intended IDPR
   recipient.  Moreover, the IDPR recipient of a control message first
   verifies that the message appears to be well-formed, before acting on
   its contents.



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   All IDPR protocols use the Control Message Transport Protocol (CMTP),
   a connectionless, transaction-based transport layer protocol, for
   communication with intended recipients of control messages.  CMTP
   retransmits unacknowledged control messages and applies integrity and
   authenticity checks to received control messages.

   There are three types of CMTP messages:

   DATAGRAM:
        Contains IDPR control messages.

   ACK: Positive acknowledgement in response to a DATAGRAM message.

   NAK: Negative acknowledgement in response to a DATAGRAM message.

   Each CMTP message contains several pieces of information supplied by
   the sender that allow the recipient to test the integrity and
   authenticity of the message.  The set of integrity and authenticity
   checks performed after CMTP message reception are collectively
   referred to as "validation checks" and are described in section 2.3.

   When we first designed the IDPR protocols, CMTP as a distinct
   protocol did not exist.  Instead, CMTP-equivalent functionality was
   embedded in each IDPR protocol.  To provide a cleaner implementation,
   we later decided to provide a single transport protocol that could be
   used by all IDPR protocols.  We originally considered using an
   existing transport protocol, but rejected this approach for the
   following reasons:

   - The existing reliable transport protocols do not provide all of the
     validation checks, in particular the timestamp and authenticity
     checks, required by the IDPR protocols.  Hence, if we were to use
     one of these protocols, we would still have to provide a separate
     protocol on top of the transport protocol to force retransmission of
     IDPR messages that failed to pass the required validation checks.

   - Many of the existing reliable transport protocols are window-based
     and hence can result in increased message delay and resource use
     when, as is the case with IDPR, multiple independent messages use
     the same transport connection.  A single message experiencing
     transmission problems and requiring retransmission can prevent the
     window from advancing, forcing all subsequent messages to queue
     behind it.  Moreover, many of the window-based protocols do not
     support selective retransmission of failed messages but instead
     require retransmission of not only the failed message but also all
     preceding messages within the window.

   For these reasons, we decided against using an existing transport



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   protocol and in favor of developing CMTP.

2.1.  Message Transmission

   At the transmitting entity, when an IDPR protocol is ready to issue a
   control message, it passes a copy of the message to CMTP; it also
   passes a set of parameters to CMTP for inclusion in the CMTP header
   and for proper CMTP message handling.  In turn, CMTP converts the
   control message and associated parameters into a DATAGRAM by
   prepending the appropriate header to the control message.  The CMTP
   header contains several pieces of information to aid the message
   recipient in detecting errors (see section 2.4).  Each IDPR protocol
   can specify all of the following CMTP parameters applicable to its
   control message:

   -   IDPR protocol and message type.

   -   Destination.

   -   Integrity/authentication scheme.

   -   Timestamp.

   -   Maximum number of transmissions allotted.

   -   Retransmission interval in microseconds.

   One of these parameters, the timestamp, can be specified directly by
   CMTP as the internal clock time at which the message is transmitted.
   However, two of the IDPR protocols, namely flooding and path control,
   themselves require message generation timestamps for proper protocol
   operation.  Thus, instead of requiring CMTP to pass back a timestamp
   to an IDPR protocol, we simplify the service interface between CMTP
   and the IDPR protocols by allowing an IDPR protocol to specify the
   timestamp in the first place.

   Using the control message and accompanying parameters supplied by the
   IDPR protocol, CMTP constructs a DATAGRAM, adding to the header
   CMTP-specific parameters.  In particular, CMTP assigns a "transaction
   identifier" to each DATAGRAM generated, which it uses to associate
   acknowledgements with DATAGRAM messages.  Each DATAGRAM recipient
   includes the received transaction identifier in its returned ACK or
   NAK, and each DATAGRAM sender uses the transaction identifier to
   match the received ACK or NAK with the original DATAGRAM.

   A single DATAGRAM, for example a routing information message or a
   path control message, may be handled by CMTP at many different policy
   gateways.  Within a pair of consecutive IDPR entities, the DATAGRAM



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   sender expects to receive an acknowledgement from the DATAGRAM
   recipient.  However, only the IDPR entity that actually generated the
   original CMTP DATAGRAM has control over the transaction identifier,
   because that entity may supply a digital signature that covers the
   entire DATAGRAM.  The intermediate policy gateways that transmit the
   DATAGRAM do not change the transaction identifier.  Nevertheless, at
   each DATAGRAM recipient, the transaction identifier must uniquely
   distinguish the DATAGRAM so that only one acknowledgement from the
   next DATAGRAM recipient matches the original DATAGRAM.  Therefore,
   the transaction identifier must be globally unique.

   The transaction identifier consists of the numeric identifiers for
   the domain and IDPR entity (policy gateway or route server) issuing
   the original DATAGRAM, together with a 32-bit local identifier
   assigned by CMTP operating within that IDPR entity.  We recommend
   implementing the 32-bit local identifier either as a simple counter
   incremented for each DATAGRAM generated or as a fine granularity
   clock.  The former always guarantees uniqueness of transaction
   identifiers; the latter guarantees uniqueness of transaction
   identifiers, provided the clock granularity is finer than the minimum
   possible interval between DATAGRAM generations and the clock wrapping
   period is longer than the maximum round-trip delay to and from any
   internetwork destination.

   Before transmitting a DATAGRAM, CMTP computes the length of the
   entire message, taking into account the prescribed
   integrity/authentication scheme, and then computes the
   integrity/authentication value over the whole message.  CMTP includes
   both of these quantities, which are crucial for checking message
   integrity and authenticity at the recipient, in the DATAGRAM header.
   After sending a DATAGRAM, CMTP saves a copy and sets an associated
   retransmission timer, as directed by the IDPR protocol parameters.
   If the retransmission timer fires and CMTP has received neither an
   ACK nor a NAK for the DATAGRAM, CMTP then retransmits the DATAGRAM,
   provided this retransmission does not exceed the transmission
   allotment.  Whenever a DATAGRAM exhausts its transmission allotment,
   CMTP discards the DATAGRAM, informs the IDPR protocol that the
   control message transmission was not successful, and logs the event
   for network management.  In this case, the IDPR protocol may either
   resubmit its control message to CMTP, specifying an alternate
   destination, or discard the control message altogether.










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2.2.  Message Reception

   At the receiving entity, when CMTP obtains a DATAGRAM, it takes one
   of the following actions, depending upon the outcome of the message
   validation checks:

   - The DATAGRAM passes the CMTP validation checks.  CMTP then delivers
     the DATAGRAM with enclosed IDPR control message, to the appropriate
     IDPR protocol, which in turn applies its own integrity checks to
     the control message before acting on the contents.  The recipient
     IDPR protocol, except in one case, directs CMTP to generate an ACK
     and return the ACK to the sender.  That exception is the up/down
     protocol (see section 3.2) which determines reachability of
     adjacent policy gateways and does not use CMTP ACK messages to
     notify the sender of message reception.  Instead, the up/down
     protocol messages themselves carry implicit information about
     message reception at the adjacent policy gateway.  In the cases
     where the recipient IDPR protocol directs CMTP to generate an ACK,
     it may pass control information to CMTP for inclusion in the ACK,
     depending on the contents of the original IDPR control message.
     For example, a route server unable to fill a request for routing
     information may inform the requesting IDPR entity, through an ACK
     for the initial request, to place its request elsewhere.

   - The DATAGRAM fails at least one of the CMTP validation checks.
     CMTP then generates a NAK, returns the NAK to the sender, and
     discards the DATAGRAM, regardless of the type of IDPR control
     message contained in the DATAGRAM.  The NAK indicates the nature of
     the validation failure and serves to help the sender establish
     communication with the recipient.  In particular, the CMTP NAK
     provides a mechanism for negotiation of IDPR version and
     integrity/authentication scheme, two parameters crucial for
     establishing communication between IDPR entities.

   Upon receiving an ACK or a NAK, CMTP immediately discards the message
   if at least one of the validation checks fails or if it is unable to
   locate the associated DATAGRAM.  CMTP logs the latter event for
   network management.  Otherwise, if all of the validation checks pass
   and if it is able to locate the associated DATAGRAM, CMTP clears the
   associated retransmission timer and then takes one of the following
   actions, depending upon the message type:

   - The message is an ACK.  CMTP discards the associated DATAGRAM and
     delivers the ACK, which may contain IDPR control information, to
     the appropriate IDPR protocol.

   - The message is a NAK.  If the associated DATAGRAM has exhausted its
     transmission allotment, CMTP discards the DATAGRAM, informs the



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RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993


     appropriate IDPR protocol that the control message transmission was
     not successful, and logs the event for network management.
     Otherwise, if the associated DATAGRAM has not yet exhausted its
     transmission allotment, CMTP first checks its copy of the DATAGRAM
     against the failure indication contained in the NAK.  If its
     DATAGRAM copy appears to be intact, CMTP retransmits the DATAGRAM
     and sets the associated retransmission timer.  However, if its
     DATAGRAM copy appears to be corrupted, CMTP discards the DATAGRAM,
     informs the IDPR protocol that the control message transmission was
     not successful, and logs the event for network management.

2.3.  Message Validation

   On every CMTP message received, CMTP performs a set of validation
   checks to test message integrity and authenticity.  The order in
   which these tests are executed is important.  CMTP must first
   determine if it can parse enough of the message to compute the
   integrity/authentication value.  (Refer to section 2.4 for a
   description of CMTP message formats.)  Then, CMTP must immediately
   compute the integrity/authentication value before checking other
   header information.  An incorrect integrity/authentication value
   means that the message is corrupted, and so it is likely that CMTP
   header information is incorrect.  Checking specific header fields
   before computing the integrity/authentication value not only may
   waste time and resources, but also may lead to incorrect diagnoses of
   a validation failure.

   The CMTP validation checks are as follows:

   - CMTP verifies that it can recognize both the control message
     version type contained in the header.  Failure to recognize either
     one of these values means that CMTP cannot continue to parse the
     message.

   - CMTP verifies that it can recognize and accept the
     integrity/authentication type contained in the header; no
     integrity/authentication is not an acceptable type for CMTP.

   - CMTP computes the integrity/authentication value and verifies that
     it equals the integrity/authentication value contained in the
     header.  For key-based integrity/authentication schemes, CMTP may
     use the source domain identifier contained in the CMTP header to
     index the correct key.  Failure to index a key means that CMTP
     cannot compute the integrity/authentication value.

   - CMTP computes the message length in bytes and verifies that it
     equals the length value contained in the header.




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   - CMTP verifies that the message timestamp is in the acceptable
     range.  The message should be no more recent than cmtp_new (300)
     seconds ahead of the entity's current internal clock time.  In this
     document, when we present an IDPR system configuration parameter,
     such as cmtp_new, we usually follow it with a recommended value in
     parentheses.  The cmtp_new value allows some clock drift between
     IDPR entities.  Moreover, each IDPR protocol has its own limit on
     the maximum age of its control messages.  The message should be no
     less recent than a prescribed number of seconds behind the
     recipient entity's current internal clock time.  Hence, each IDPR
     protocol performs its own message timestamp check in addition to
     that performed by CMTP.

   - CMTP verifies that it can recognize the IDPR protocol designated
     for the enclosed control message.

   Whenever CMTP encounters a failure while performing any of these
   validation checks, it logs the event for network management.  If the
   failure occurs on a DATAGRAM, CMTP immediately generates a NAK
   containing the reason for the failure, returns the NAK to the sender,
   and discards the DATAGRAM message.  If the failure occurs on an ACK
   or a NAK, CMTP discards the ACK or NAK message.

2.4.  CMTP Message Formats

   In designing the format of IDPR control messages, we have attempted
   to strike a balance between efficiency of link bandwidth usage and
   efficiency of message processing.  In general, we have chosen compact
   representations for IDPR information in order to minimize the link
   bandwidth consumed by IDPR-specific information.  However, we have
   also organized IDPR information in order to speed message processing,
   which does not always result in minimum link bandwidth usage.

   To limit link bandwidth usage, we currently use fixed-length
   identifier fields in IDPR messages; domains, virtual gateways, policy
   gateways, and route servers are all represented by fixed-length
   identifiers.  To simplify message processing, we currently align
   fields containing an even number of bytes on even-byte boundaries
   within a message.  In the future, if the Internet adopts the use of
   super domains, we will offer hierarchical, variable-length identifier
   fields in an updated version of IDPR.

   The header of each CMTP message contains the following information:








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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    VERSION    |  PRT  |  MSG  |  DPR  |  DMS  |    I/A TYP    |
   +---------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+---------------+
   |           SOURCE AD           |           SOURCE ENT          |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |                           TRANS ID                            |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                           TIMESTAMP                           |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            LENGTH             |       message specific        |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |         DATAGRAM AD           |         DATAGRAM ENT          |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |                             INFORM                            |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            INT/AUTH                           |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+

   VERSION
        (8 bits) Version number for IDPR control messages, currently
        equal to 1.

   PRT (4 bits) Numeric identifier for the control message transport
        protocol, equal to 0 for CMTP.

   MSG (4 bits) Numeric identifier for the CMTP message type,equal to 0
        for a DATAGRAM, 1 for an ACK, and 2 for a NAK.

   DPR (4 bits) Numeric identifier for the original DATAGRAM's IDPR
        protocol type.

   DMS (4 bits) Numeric identifier for the original DATAGRAM's IDPR
        message type.

   I/A TYP (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the integrity/authentication
        scheme used.  CMTP requires the use of an
        integrity/authentication scheme; this value must not be set
        equal to 0, indicating no integrity/authentication in use.

   SOURCE AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain containing the
        IDPR entity that generated the message.

   SOURCE ENT (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the IDPR entity that
        generated the message.




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   TRANSACTION ID (32 bits) Local transaction identifier assigned by the
        IDPR entity that generated the original DATAGRAM.

   TIMESTAMP (32 bits) Number of seconds elapsed since 1 January 1970
        0:00 GMT.

   LENGTH (16 bits) Length of the entire IDPR control message, including
        the CMTP header, in bytes.

   message specific (16 bits) Dependent upon CMTP message type.

        For DATAGRAM and ACK messages:

             RESERVED
                  (16 bits) Reserved for future use and currently set
                  equal to 0.

        For NAK messages:

             ERR TYP (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the type of CMTP
                  validation failure encountered.  Validation failures
                  include the following types:

                  1.   Unrecognized IDPR control message version number.

                  2.   Unrecognized CMTP message type.

                  3.   Unrecognized integrity/authentication scheme.

                  4.   Unacceptable integrity/authentication scheme.

                  5.   Unable to locate key using source domain.

                  6.   Incorrect integrity/authentication value.

                  7.   Incorrect message length.

                  8.   Message timestamp out of range.

                  9.   Unrecognized IDPR protocol designated for the
                  enclosed control message.










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             ERR INFO (8 bits) CMTP supplies the following additional
                  information for the designated types of validation
                  failures:

                  Type 1:
                      Acceptable IDPR control message version number.

                  Types 3 and 4: Acceptable integrity/authentication
                      type.

   DATAGRAM AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain containing the IDPR
        entity that generated the original DATAGRAM.  Present only in
        ACK and NAK messages.

   DATAGRAM ENT (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the IDPR entity that
        generated the original DATAGRAM.  Present only in ACK and NAK
        messages.

   INFORM (optional,variable) Information to be interpreted by the IDPR
        protocol that issued the original DATAGRAM.  Present only in ACK
        messages and dependent on the original DATAGRAM's IDPR protocol
        type.

   INT/AUTH (variable) Computed integrity/authentication value,
        dependent on the type of integrity/authentication scheme used.

3.  Virtual Gateway Protocol

   Every policy gateway within a domain participates in gathering
   information about connectivity within and between virtual gateways of
   which it is a member and in distributing this information to other
   virtual gateways in its domain.  We refer to these functions
   collectively as the Virtual Gateway Protocol (VGP).

   The information collected through VGP has both local and global
   significance for IDPR.  Virtual gateway connectivity information,
   distributed to policy gateways within a single domain, aids those
   policy gateways in selecting routes across and between virtual
   gateways connecting their domain to adjacent domains.  Inter-domain
   connectivity information, distributed throughout an internetwork in
   routing information messages, aids route servers in constructing
   feasible policy routes.

   Provided that a domain contains simple virtual gateway and transit
   policy configurations, one need only implement a small subset of the
   VGP functions.  The connectivity among policy gateways within a
   virtual gateway and the heterogeneity of transit policies within a



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   domain determine which VGP functions must be implemented, as we
   explain toward the end of this section.

3.1.  Message Scope

   Policy gateways generate VGP messages containing information about
   perceived changes in virtual gateway connectivity and distribute
   these messages to other policy gateways within the same domain and
   within the same virtual gateway.  We classify VGP messages into three
   distinct categories: "pair-PG", "intra-VG", and "inter-VG", depending
   upon the scope of message distribution.

   Policy gateways use CMTP for reliable transport of VGP messages.  The
   issuing policy gateway must communicate to CMTP the maximum number of
   transmissions per VGP message, vgp_ret, and the interval between VGP
   message retransmissions, vgp_int microseconds.  The recipient policy
   gateway must determine VGP message acceptability; conditions of
   acceptability depend on the type of VGP message, as we describe
   below.

   Policy gateways store, act upon, and in the case of inter-VG
   messages, forward the information contained in acceptable VGP
   messages.  VGP messages that pass the CMTP validation checks but fail
   a specific VGP message acceptability check are considered to be
   unacceptable and are hence discarded by recipient policy gateways.  A
   policy gateway that receives an unacceptable VGP message also logs
   the event for network management.

3.1.1.  Pair-PG Messages

   Pair-PG message communication occurs between the two members of a
   pair of adjacent, peer, or neighbor policy gateways.  With IDPR, the
   only pair-PG messages are those periodically generated by the up/down
   protocol and used to monitor mutual reachability between policy
   gateways.

   A pair-PG message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than vgp_old (300) seconds behind the
     recipient's internal clock time.

   - Its destination policy gateway identifier coincides with the
     identifier of the recipient policy gateway.

   - Its source policy gateway identifier coincides with the identifier
     of a policy gateway configured for the recipient's domain or



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     associated virtual gateway.

3.1.2.  Intra-VG Messages

   Intra-VG message communication occurs between one policy gateway and
   all of its peers.  Whenever a policy gateway discovers that its
   connectivity to an adjacent or neighbor policy gateway has changed,
   it issues an intra-VG message indicating the connectivity change to
   all of its reachable peers.  Whenever a policy gateway detects that a
   previously unreachable peer is now reachable, it issues, to that
   peer, intra-VG messages indicating connectivity to adjacent and
   neighbor policy gateways.  If the issuing policy gateway fails to
   receive an analogous intra-VG message from the newly reachable peer
   within twice the configured VGP retransmission interval, vgp_int
   microseconds, it actively requests the intra-VG message from that
   peer.  These message exchanges ensure that peers maintain a
   consistent view of each others' connectivity to adjacent and neighbor
   policy gateways.

   An intra-VG message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than vgp_old (300) seconds behind the
     recipient's internal clock time.

   - Its virtual gateway identifier coincides with that of a virtual
     gateway configured for the recipient's domain.

3.1.3.  Inter-VG Messages

   Inter-VG message communication occurs between one policy gateway and
   all of its neighbors.  Whenever the lowest-numbered operational
   policy gateway in a set of mutually reachable peers discovers that
   its virtual gateway's connectivity to the adjacent domain or to
   another virtual gateway has changed, it issues an inter-VG message
   indicating the connectivity change to all of its neighbors.
   Specifically, the policy gateway distributes an inter-VG message to a
   "VG representative" policy gateway (see section 3.1.4 below) in each
   virtual gateway in the domain.  Each VG representative in turn
   propagates the inter-VG message to each of its peers.

   Whenever the lowest-numbered operational policy gateway in a set of
   mutually peers detects that one or more previously unreachable peers
   are now reachable, it issues, to the lowest-numbered operational
   policy gateway in all other virtual gateways, requests for inter-VG
   information indicating connectivity to adjacent domains and to other
   virtual gateways.  The recipient policy gateways return the requested



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   inter-VG messages to the issuing policy gateway, which in turn
   distributes the messages to the newly reachable peers.  These message
   exchanges ensure that virtual gateways maintain a consistent view of
   each others' connectivity, while consuming minimal domain resources
   in distributing connectivity information.

   An inter-VG message contains information about the entire virtual
   gateway, not just about the issuing policy gateway.  Thus, when
   virtual gateway connectivity changes happen in rapid succession,
   recipients of the resultant inter-VG messages should be able to
   determine the most recent message and that message must contain the
   current virtual gateway connectivity information.  To ensure that the
   connectivity information distributed is consistent and unambiguous,
   we designate a single policy gateway, namely the lowest-numbered
   operational peer, for generating and distributing inter-VG messages.
   It is a simple procedure for a set of mutually reachable peers to
   determine the lowest-numbered member, as we describe in section 3.2
   below.

   To understand why a single member of a virtual gateway must issue
   inter-VG messages, consider the following example.  Suppose that two
   peers in a virtual gateway each detect a different connectivity
   change and generate separate inter-VG messages.  Recipients of these
   messages may not be able to determine which message is more recent if
   policy gateway internal clocks are not perfectly synchronized.
   Moreover, even if the clocks were perfectly synchronized, and hence
   message recency could be consistently determined, it is possible for
   each peer to issue its inter-VG message before receiving current
   information from the other.  As a result, neither inter-VG message
   contains the correct connectivity from the perspective of the virtual
   gateway.  However, these problems are eliminated if all inter-VG
   messages are generated by a single peer within a virtual gateway, in
   particular the lowest-numbered operational policy gateway.

   An inter-VG message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than vgp_old (300) seconds behind the
     recipient's internal clock time.

   - Its virtual gateway identifier coincides with that of a virtual
     gateway configured for the recipient's domain.

   - Its source policy gateway identifier represents the lowest numbered
     operational member of the issuing virtual gateway, reachable from
     the recipient.




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   Distribution of intra-VG messages among peers often triggers
   generation and distribution of inter-VG messages among virtual
   gateways.  Usually, the lowest-numbered operational policy gateway in
   a virtual gateway generates and distributes an inter-VG message
   immediately after detecting a change in virtual gateway connectivity,
   through receipt or generation of an intra-VG message.  However, if
   this policy gateway is also waiting for an intra-VG message from a
   newly reachable peer, it does not immediately generate and distribute
   the inter-VG message.

   Waiting for intra-VG messages enables the lowest-numbered operational
   policy gateway in a virtual gateway to gather the most recent
   connectivity information for inclusion in the inter-VG message.
   However, under unusual circumstances, the policy gateway may fail to
   receive an intra-VG message from a newly reachable peer, even after
   actively requesting such a message.  To accommodate this case, VGP
   uses an upper bound of four times the configured retransmission
   interval, vgp_int microseconds, on the amount of time to wait before
   generating and distributing an inter-VG message, when receipt of an
   intra-VG message is pending.

3.1.4.  VG Representatives

   When distributing an inter-VG message, the issuing policy gateway
   selects as recipients one neighbor, the VG Representative, from each
   virtual gateway in the domain.  To be selected as a VG
   representative, a policy gateway must be reachable from the issuing
   policy gateway via intra-domain routing.  The issuing policy gateway
   gives preference to neighbors that are members of more than one
   virtual gateway.  Such a neighbor acts as a VG representative for all
   virtual gateways of which it is a member and restricts inter-VG
   message distribution as follows: any policy gateway that is a peer in
   more than one of the represented virtual gateways receives at most
   one copy of the inter-VG message.  This message distribution strategy
   minimizes the number of message copies required for disseminating
   inter-VG information.

3.2.  Up/Down Protocol

   Directly-connected adjacent policy gateways execute the Up/Down
   Protocol to determine mutual reachability.  Pairs of peer or neighbor
   policy gateways can determine mutual reachability through information
   provided by the intra-domain routing procedure or through execution
   of the up/down protocol.  In general, we do not recommend
   implementing the up/down protocol between each pair of policy
   gateways in a domain, as it results in O(n**2) (where n is the number
   of policy gateways within the domain) communications complexity.
   However, if the intra-domain routing procedure is slow to detect



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   connectivity changes or is unable to report reachability at the IDPR
   entity level, the reachability information obtained through the
   up/down protocol may well be worth the extra communications cost.  In
   the remainder of this section, we decribe the up/down protocol from
   the perspective of adjacent policy gateways, but we note that the
   identical protocol can be applied to peer and neighbor policy
   gateways as well.

   The up/down protocol determines whether the direct connection between
   adjacent policy gateways is acceptable for data traffic transport.  A
   direct connection is presumed to be "down" (unacceptable for data
   traffic transport) until the up/down protocol declares it to be "up"
   (acceptable for data traffic transport).  We say that a virtual
   gateway is "up" if there exists at least one pair of adjacent policy
   gateways whose direct connection is acceptable for data traffic
   transport, and that a virtual gateway is "down" if there exists no
   such pair of adjacent policy gateways.

   When executing the up/down protocol, policy gateways exchange UP/DOWN
   messages every ud_per (1) second.  All policy gateways use the same
   default period of ud_per initially and then negotiate a preferred
   period through exchange of UP/DOWN messages.  A policy gateway
   reports its desired value for ud_per within its UP/DOWN messages.  It
   then chooses the larger of its desired value and that of the adjacent
   policy gateway as the period for exchanging subsequent UP/DOWN
   messages.  Policy gateways also exchange, in UP/DOWN messages,
   information about the identity of their respective domain components.
   This information assists the policy gateways in selecting routes
   across virtual gateways to partitioned domains.

   Each UP/DOWN message is transported using CMTP and hence is covered
   by the CMTP validation checks.  However, unlike other IDPR control
   messages, UP/DOWN messages do not require reliable transport.
   Specifically, the up/down protocol requires only a single
   transmission per UP/DOWN message and never directs CMTP to return an
   ACK.  As pair-PG messages, UP/DOWN messages are acceptable under the
   conditions described in section 3.1.1.

   Each policy gateway assesses the state of its direct connection, to
   the adjacent policy gateway, by counting the number of acceptable
   UP/DOWN messages received within a set of consecutive periods.  A
   policy gateway communicates its perception of the state of the direct
   connection through its UP/DOWN messages.  Initially, a policy gateway
   indicates the down state in each of its UP/DOWN messages.  Only when
   the direct connection appears to be up from its perspective does a
   policy gateway indicate the up state in its UP/DOWN messages.

   A policy gateway can begin to transport data traffic over a direct



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   connection only if both of the following conditions are true:

   - The policy gateway receives from the adjacent policy gateway at
     least j acceptable UP/DOWN messages within the last m consecutive
     periods.  From the recipient policy gateway's perspective, this
     event up.  Hence, the recipient policy gateway indicates the up
     state in its subsequent UP/DOWN messages.

   - The UP/DOWN message most recently received from the adjacent policy
     gateway indicates the up state, signifying that the adjacent policy
     gateway considers the direct connection to be up.

   A policy gateway must cease to transport data traffic over a direct
   connection whenever either of the following conditions is true:

   - The policy gateway receives from the adjacent policy gateway at
     most acceptable UP/DOWN messages within the last n consecutive
     periods.

   - The UP/DOWN message most recently received from the adjacent policy
     gateway indicates the down state, signifying that the adjacent
     policy gateway considers the direct connection to be down.

   From the recipient policy gateway's perspective, either of these
   events constitutes a state transition of the direct connection from
   up to down.  Hence, the policy gateway indicates the down state in
   its subsequent UP/DOWN messages.

3.3.  Implementation

   We recommend implementing the up/down protocol using a sliding
   window.  Each window slot indicates the UP/DOWN message activity
   during a given period, containing either a "hit" for receipt of an
   acceptable UP/DOWN message or a "miss" for failure to receive an
   acceptable UP/DOWN message.  In addition to the sliding window, the
   implementation should include a tally of hits recorded during the
   current period and a tally of misses recorded over the current
   window.

   When the direct connection moves to the down state, the initial
   values of the up/down protocol parameters must be set as follows:

   -   The sliding window size is equal to m.

   -   Each window slot contains a miss.

   -   The current period hit tally is equal to 0.




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   -   The current window miss tally is equal to m.

   When the direct connection moves to the up state, the initial values
   of the up/down protocol parameters must be set as follows:

   -   The sliding window size is equal to n.

   -   Each window slot contains a hit.

   -   The current period hit tally is equal to 0.

   -   The current window miss tally is equal to 0.

   At the conclusion of each period, a policy gateway computes the miss
   tally and determines whether there has been a state transition of the
   direct connection to the adjacent policy gateway.  In the down state,
   a miss tally of no more than m - j signals a transition to the up
   state.  In the up state, a miss tally of no less than n - k signals a
   transition to the down state.

   Computing the correct miss tally involves several steps.  First, the
   policy gateway prepares to slide the window by one slot so that the
   oldest slot disappears, making room for the newest slot.  However,
   before sliding the window, the policy gateway checks the contents of
   the oldest window slot.  If this slot contains a miss, the policy
   gateway decrements the miss tally by 1, as this slot is no longer
   part of the current window.

   After sliding the window, the policy gateway determines the proper
   contents.  If the hit tally for the current period equals 0, the
   policy gateway records a miss for the newest slot and increments the
   miss tally by 1.  Otherwise, if the hit tally for the current period
   is greater than 0, the policy gateway records a hit for the newest
   slot and decrements the hit tally by 1.  Moreover, the policy gateway
   applies any remaining hits to slots containing misses, beginning with
   the newest and progressing to the oldest such slot.  For each such
   slot containing a miss, the policy gateway records a hit in that slot
   and decrements both the hit and miss tallies by 1, as the hit cancels
   out a miss.  The policy gateway continues to apply each remaining hit
   tallied to any slot containing a miss, until either all such hits are
   exhausted or all such slots are accounted for.  Before beginning the
   next up/down period, the policy gateway resets the hit tally to 0.

   Although we expect the hit tally, within any given period, to be no
   greater than 1, we do anticipate the occasional period in which a
   policy gateway receives more than one UP/DOWN message from an
   adjacent policy gateway.  The most common reasons for this occurrence
   are message delay and clock drift.  When an UP/DOWN message is



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   delayed, the receiving policy gateway observes a miss in one period
   followed by two hits in the next period, one of which cancels the
   previous miss.  However, excess hits remaining in the tally after
   miss cancellation indicate a problem, such as clock drift.  Thus,
   whenever a policy gateway accumulates excess hits, it logs the event
   for network management.

   When clock drift occurs between two adjacent policy gateways, it
   causes the period of one policy gateway to grow with respect to the
   period of the other policy gateway.  Let p(X) be the period for PG X,
   let p(Y) be the period for PG Y, and let g and h be the smallest
   positive integers such that g * p(X) = h * p(Y).  Suppose that p(Y) >
   p(X) because of clock drift.  In this case, PG X observes g - h
   misses in g consecutive periods, while PG Y observes g - h surplus
   hits in h consecutive periods.  As long as (g - h)/g < (n - k)/n and
   (g - h)/g < or = (m - j)/m, the clock drift itself will not cause the
   direct connection to enter or remain in the down state.

3.4.  Policy Gateway Connectivity

   Policy gateways collect connectivity information through the intra-
   domain routing procedure and through VGP, and they distribute
   connectivity changes through VGP in both intra-VG messages to peers
   and inter-VG messages to neighbors.  Locally, this connectivity
   information assists policy gateways in selecting routes, not only
   across a virtual gateway to an adjacent domain but also across a
   domain between two virtual gateways.  Moreover, changes in
   connectivity between domains are distributed, in routing information
   messages, to route servers throughout an internetwork.

3.4.1.  Within a Virtual Gateway

   Each policy gateway within a virtual gateway constantly monitors its
   connectivity to all adjacent and to all peer policy gateways.  To
   determine the state of its direct connection to an adjacent policy
   gateway, a policy gateway uses reachability information supplied by
   the up/down protocol.  To determine the state of its intra-domain
   routes to a peer policy gateway, a policy gateway uses reachability
   information supplied by either the intra-domain routing procedure or
   the up/down protocol.

   A policy gateway generates a PG CONNECT message whenever either of
   the following conditions is true:

   -   The policy gateway detects a change, in state or in adjacent
       domain component, associated with its direct connection to an
       adjacent policy gateway.  In this case, the policy gateway
       distributes a copy of the message to each peer reachable via



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       intra-domain routing.

   -   The policy gateway detects that a previously unreachable peer is
       now reachable.  In this case, the policy gateway distributes a
       copy of the message to the newly reachable peer.

   A PG CONNECT message is an intra-VG message that includes information
   about each adjacent policy gateway directly connected to the issuing
   policy gateway.  Specifically, the PG CONNECT message contains the
   adjacent policy gateway's identifier, status (reachable or
   unreachable), and domain component identifier.  If a PG CONNECT
   message contains a "request", each peer that receives the message
   responds to the sender with its own PG CONNECT message.

   All mutually reachable peers monitor policy gateway connectivity
   within their virtual gateway, through the up/down protocol, the
   intra-domain routing procedure, and the exchange of PG CONNECT
   messages.  Within a given virtual gateway, each constituent policy
   gateway maintains the following information about each configured
   adjacent policy gateway:

   - The identifier for the adjacent policy gateway.

   - The status of the adjacent policy gateway: reachable/unreachable,
     directly connected/not directly connected.

   - The local exit interfaces used to reach the adjacent policy
     gateway, provided it is reachable.

   - The identifier for the adjacent policy gateway's domain component.

   - The set of peers to which the adjacent policy gateway is
     directly-connected.

   Hence, all mutually reachable peers can detect changes in
   connectivity across the virtual gateway to adjacent domain
   components.

   When the lowest-numbered operational peer policy gateway within a
   virtual gateway detects a change in the set of adjacent domain
   components reachable through direct connections across the given
   virtual gateway, it generates a VGCONNECT message and distributes a
   copy to a VG representative in all other virtual gateways connected
   to its domain.  A VG CONNECT message is an inter-VG message that
   includes information about each peer's connectivity across the given
   virtual gateway.  Specifically, the VG CONNECT message contains, for
   each peer, its identifier and the identifiers of the domain
   components reachable through its direct connections to adjacent



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   policy gateways.  Moreover, the VG CONNECT message gives each
   recipient enough information to determine the state, up or down, of
   the issuing virtual gateway.

   The issuing policy gateway, namely the lowest-numbered operational
   peer, may have to wait up to four times vgp_int microseconds after
   detecting the connectivity change, before generating and distributing
   the VGCONNECT message, as described in section 3.1.3.  Each recipient
   VG representative in turn distributes a copy of the VG CONNECT
   message to each of its peers reachable via intra-domain routing.  If
   a VG CONNECT message contains a "request", then in each recipient
   virtual gateway, the lowest-numbered operational peer that receives
   the message responds to the original sender with its own VGCONNECT
   message.

3.4.2.  Between Virtual Gateways

   At present, we expect transit policies to be uniform over all intra-
   domain routes between any pair of policy gateways within a domain.
   However, when tariffed qualities of service become prevalent
   offerings for intra-domain routing, we can no longer expect
   uniformity of transit policies throughout a domain.  To monitor the
   transit policies supported on intra-domain routes between virtual
   gateways requires both a policy-sensitive intra-domain routing
   procedure and a VGP exchange of policy information between neighbor
   policy gateways.

   Each policy gateway within a domain constantly monitors its
   connectivity to all peer and neighbor policy gateways, including the
   transit policies supported on intra-domain routes to these policy
   gateways.  To determine the state of its intra-domain connection to a
   peer or neighbor policy gateway, a policy gateway uses reachability
   information supplied by either the intra-domain routing procedure or
   the up/down protocol.  To determine the transit policies supported on
   intra-domain routes to a peer or neighbor policy gateway, a policy
   gateway uses policy-sensitive reachability information supplied by
   the intra-domain routing procedure.  We note that when transit
   policies are uniform over a domain, reachability and policy-sensitive
   reachability are equivalent.

   Within a virtual gateway, each constituent policy gateway maintains
   the following information about each configured peer and neighbor
   policy gateway:

   - The identifier for the peer or neighbor policy gateway.

   - The identifiers corresponding to the transit policies configured to
     be supported by intra-domain routes to the peer or neighbor policy



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     gateway.

   - According to each transit policy, the status of the peer or
     neighbor policy gateway: reachable/unreachable.

   - For each transit policy, the local exit interfaces used to reach
     the peer or neighbor policy gateway, provided it is reachable.

   - The identifiers for the adjacent domain components reachable
     through direct connections from the peer or neighbor policy
     gateway, obtained through VG CONNECT messages.

   Using this information, a policy gateway can detect changes in its
   connectivity to an adjoining domain component, with respect to a
   given transit policy and through a given neighbor.  Moreover,
   combining the information obtained for all neighbors within a given
   virtual gateway, the policy gateway can detect changes in its
   connectivity, with respect to a given transit policy, to that virtual
   gateway and to adjoining domain components reachable through that
   virtual gateway.

   All policy gateways mutually reachable via intra-domain routes
   supporting a configured transit policy need not exchange information
   about perceived changes in connectivity, with respect to the given
   transit policy.  In this case, each policy gateway can infer
   another's policy-sensitive reachability to a third, through mutual
   intra-domain reachability information provided by the intra-domain
   routing procedure.  However, whenever two or more policy gateways are
   no longer mutually reachable with respect to a given transit policy,
   these policy gateways can no longer infer each other's reachability
   to other policy gateways, with respect to that transit policy.  In
   this case, these policy gateways must exchange explicit information
   about changes in connectivity to other policy gateways, with respect
   to that transit policy.

   A policy gateway generates a PG POLICY message whenever either of the
   following conditions is true:

   - The policy gateway detects a change in its connectivity to another
     virtual gateway, with respect to a configured transit policy, or to
     an adjoining domain component reachable through that virtual
     gateway.  In this case, the policy gateway distributes a copy of
     the message to each peer reachable via intra-domain routing but not
     currently reachable via any intra-domain routes of the given
     transit policy.

   - The policy gateway detects that a previously unreachable peer is
     reachable.  In this case, the policy gateway distributes a copy of



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     the message to the newly reachable peer.

   A PG POLICY message is an intra-VG message that includes information
   about each configured transit policy and each virtual gateway
   configured to be reachable from the issuing policy gateway via
   intra-domain routes of the given transit policy.  Specifically, the
   PGPOLICY message contains, for each configured transit policy:

   - The identifier for the transit policy.

   - The identifiers for the virtual gateways associated with the given
     transit policy and currently reachable, with respect to that
     transit policy, from the issuing policy gateway.

   - The identifiers for the domain components reachable from and
     adjacent to the members of the given virtual gateways.

   If a PG POLICY message contains a "request", each peer that receives
   the message responds to the original sender with its own PG POLICY
   message.

   In addition to connectivity between itself and its neighbors, each
   policy gateway also monitors the connectivity, between domain
   components adjacent to its virtual gateway and domain components
   adjacent to other virtual gateways, through its domain and with
   respect to the configured transit policies.  For each member of each
   of its virtual gateways, a policy gateway monitors:

   -  The set of  adjacent domain components  currently reachable
     through direct connections across the given virtual gateway.  The
     policy gateway obtains this information through PG CONNECT messages
     from reachable peers and through UP/DOWN messages from adjacent
     policy gateways.

   - For each configured transit policy, the set of virtual gateways
     currently reachable from the given virtual gateway with respect to
     that transit policy and the set of adjoining domain components
     currently reachable through direct connections across those virtual
     gateways.  The policy gateway obtains this information through PG
     POLICY messages from peers, VG CONNECT messages from neighbors, and
     the intra-domain routing procedure.  Using this information, a
     policy gateway can detect connectivity changes, through its domain
     and with respect to a given transit policy, between adjoining
     domain components.

   When the lowest-numbered operational policy gateway within a virtual
   gateway detects a change in the connectivity between a domain
   component adjacent to its virtual gateway and a domain component



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   adjacent to another virtual gateway in its domain, with respect to a
   configured transit policy, it generates a VG POLICY message and
   distributes a copy to a VG representative in selected virtual
   gateways connected to its domain.  In particular, the lowest-numbered
   operational policy gateway distributes a VG POLICY message to a VG
   representative in every other virtual gateway containing a member
   reachable via intra-domain routing but not currently reachable via
   any routes of the given transit policy.  A VG POLICY message is an
   inter-VG message that includes information about the connectivity
   between domain components adjacent to the issuing virtual gateway and
   domain components adjacent to the other virtual gateways in the
   domain, with respect to configured transit policies.  Specifically,
   the VG POLICY message contains, for each transit policy:

   - The identifier for the transit policy.

   - The identifiers for the virtual gateways associated with the given
     transit policy and currently reachable, with respect to that
     transit policy, from the issuing virtual gateway.

   - The identifiers for the domain components reachable from and
     adjacent to the members of the given virtual gateways.

   The issuing policy gateway, namely the lowest-numbered operational
   peer, may have to wait up to four times vgp_int microseconds after
   detecting the connectivity change, before generating and distributing
   the VG POLICY message, as described in section 3.1.3.  Each recipient
   VG representative in turn distributes a copy of the VG POLICY message
   to each of its peers reachable via intra-domain routing.  If a VG
   POLICY message contains a "request", then in each recipient virtual
   gateway, the lowest-numbered operational peer that receives the
   message responds to the original sender with its own VG POLICY
   message.

3.4.3.  Communication Complexity

   We offer an example, to provide an estimate of the number of VGP
   messages exchanged within a domain, AD X, after a detected change in
   policy gateway connectivity.  Suppose that an adjacent domain, AD Y,
   partitions such that the partition is detectable through the exchange
   of UP/DOWN messages across a virtual gateway connecting AD X and AD
   Y.  Let V be the number of virtual gateways in AD X.  Suppose each
   virtual gateway contains P peer policy gateways, and no policy
   gateway is a member of multiple virtual gateways.  Then, within AD X,
   the detected partition will result in the following VGP message
   exchanges:

   - P policy gateways each receive at most P-1 PG CONNECT messages.



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     Each policy gateway detecting the adjacent domain partition
     generates a PG CONNECT message and distributes it to each reachable
     peer in the virtual gateway.

   - P * (V-1) policy gateways each receive at most one VG CONNECT
     message.  The lowest-numbered operational policy gateway in the
     virtual gateway detecting the partition of the adjacent domain
     generates a VG CONNECT message and distributes it to a VG
     representative in all other virtual gateways connected to the
     domain.  In turn, each VG representative distributes the VG CONNECT
     message to each reachable peer within its virtual gateway.

   - P * (V-1) policy gateways each receive at most P-1 PG POLICY
     messages, and only if the domain has more than a single uniform
     transit policy.  Each policy gateway in each virtual gateway
     generates a PG POLICY message and distributes it to all reachable
     peers not currently reachable with respect to the given transit
     policy.

   - P * V policy gateways each receive at most V-1 VG POLICY messages,
     only if the domain has more than a single uniform transit policy.
     The lowest-numbered operational policy gateway in each virtual
     gateway generates a VG POLICY message and distributes it to a VG
     representative in all other virtual gateways containing at least
     one reachable member not currently reachable with respect to the
     given transit policy.  In turn, each VG representative distributes
     a VG POLICY message to each peer within its virtual gateway.

3.5.  VGP Message Formats

   The virtual gateway protocol number is equal to 0.  We describe the
   contents of each type of VGP message below.

3.5.1.  UP/DOWN

   The UP/DOWN message type is equal to 0.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            SRC CMP            |            DST AD             |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            DST PG             |    PERIOD     |     STATE     |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+

   SRC CMP
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain component containing
        the issuing policy gateway.



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   DST AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the destination domain.

   DST PG (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the destination policy
        gateway.

   PERIOD (8 bits) Length of the UP/DOWN message generation period, in
        seconds.

   STATE (8 bits) Perceived state (1 up, 0 down) of the direct
        connection from the perspective of the issuing policy gateway,
        contained in the right-most bit.

3.5.2.  PG CONNECT

   The PG CONNECT message type is equal to 1.  PG CONNECT messages are
   not required for any virtual gateway containing exactly two policy
   gateways.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |     RQST      |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            NUM RCH            |           NUM UNRCH           |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each reachable adjacent policy gateway:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ PG             |            ADJ CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each unreachable adjacent policy gateway:
   +-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ PG             |
   +-------------------------------+

   ADJ AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway.

   RQST (8 bits) Request for a PG CONNECT message (1 request, 0 no
        request) from each recipient peer, contained in the right-most
        bit.

   NUM RCH (16 bits) Number of adjacent policy gateways within the
        virtual gateway, which are directly-connected to and currently
        reachable from the issuing policy gateway.

   NUM UNRCH (16 bits) Number of adjacent policy gateways within the



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        virtual gateway, which are directly-connected to but not
        currently reachable from the issuing policy gateway.

   ADJ PG (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a directly-connected adjacent
        policy gateway.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain component
        containing the reachable, directly-connected adjacent policy
        gateway.

3.5.3.  PG POLICY

   The PG POLICY message type is equal to 2.  PG POLICY messages are not
   required for any virtual gateway containing exactly two policy
   gateways or for any domain with a single uniform transit policy.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |     RQST      |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            NUM TP             |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each transit policy associated with the virtual gateway:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |            NUM VG             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each virtual gateway reachable via the transit policy:
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |    UNUSED     |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            NUM CMP            |            ADJ CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+

   ADJ AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway.

   RQST (8 bits) Request for a PG POLICY message (1 request, 0 no
        request) from each recipient peer, contained in the right-most
        bit.

   NUM TP (8 bits) Number of transit policies configured to include the
        virtual gateway.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy associated with
        the virtual gateway.



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   NUM VG (16 bits) Number of virtual gateways reachable from the
        issuing policy gateway, via intra-domain routes supporting the
        transit policy.

   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

   NUM CMP (16 bits) Number of adjacent domain components reachable via
        direct connections through the virtual gateway.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a reachable adjacent domain
        component.

3.5.4.  VG CONNECT

   The VG CONNECT message type is equal to 3.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |     RQST      |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            NUM PG             |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each reach policy gateway in the virtual gateway:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              PG               |            NUM CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+

   ADJ AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway.

   RQST (8 bits) Request for a VG CONNECT message (1 request, 0 no
        request) from a recipient in each virtual gateway, contained in
        the right-most bit.

   NUM PG (16 bits) Number of mutually-reachable peer policy gateways in
        the virtual gateway.

   PG (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a peer policy gateway.

   NUM CMP (16 bits) Number of components of the adjacent domain
        reachable via direct connections from the policy gateway.





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   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a reachable adjacent domain
        component.

3.5.5.  VG POLICY

   The VG POLICY message type is equal to 4.  VG POLICY messages are not
   required for any domain with a single uniform transit policy.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |     RQST      |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            NUM TP             |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each transit policy associated with the virtual gateway:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |            NUM GRP            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each virtual gateway group reachable via the transit policy:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM VG             |            ADJ AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |     VG        |    UNUSED     |            NUM CMP            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+

   ADJ AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway.

   RQST (8 bits) Request for a VG POLICY message (1 request, 0 no
        request) from a recipient in each virtual gateway, contained in
        the right-most bit.

   NUM TP (16 bits) Number of transit policies configured to include the
        virtual gateway.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy associated with
        the virtual gateway.

   NUM GRP (16 bits) Number of groups of virtual gateways, such that all
        members in a group are reachable from the issuing virtual
        gateway via intra-domain routes supporting the given transit
        policy.




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   NUM VG (16 bits) Number of virtual gateways in a virtual gateway
        group.

   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

   NUM CMP (16 bits) Number of adjacent domain components reachable via
        direct connections through the virtual gateway.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a reachable adjacent domain
        component.

   Normally, each VG POLICY message will contain a single virtual
   gateway group.  However, if the issuing virtual gateway becomes
   partitioned such that peers are mutually reachable with respect to
   some transit policies but not others, virtual gateway groups may be
   necessary.  For example, let PG X and PG Y be two peers in VG A which
   configured to support transit policies 1 and 2.  Suppose that PG X
   and PG Y are reachable with respect to transit policy 1 but not with
   respect to transit policy 2.  Furthermore, suppose that PG X can
   reach members of VG B via intra-domain routes of transit policy 2 and
   that PG Y can reach members of VG C via intra-domain routes of
   transit policy 2.  Then the entry in the VG POLICY message issued by
   VG A will include, for transit policy 2, two groups of virtual
   gateways, one containing VG B and one containing VG C.

3.5.6.  Negative Acknowledgements

   When a policy gateway receives an unacceptable VGP message that
   passes the CMTP validation checks, it includes, in its CMTP ACK, an
   appropriate VGP negative acknowledgement.  This information is placed
   in the INFORM field of the CMTP ACK (described previously in section
   2.4); the numeric identifier for each type of VGP negative
   acknowledgement is contained in the left-most 8 bits of the INFORM
   field.  Negative acknowledgements associated with VGP include the
   following types:

   1.  Unrecognized VGP message type.  Numeric identifier for the
       unrecognized message type (8 bits).

   2.  Out-of-date VGP message.

   3.  Unrecognized virtual gateway source.  Numeric identifier for the
       unrecognized virtual gateway including the adjacent domain
       identifier (16 bits) and the local identifier (8 bits).







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4.  Routing Information Distribution

   Each domain participating in IDPR generates and distributes its
   routing information messages to route servers throughout an
   internetwork.  IDPR routing information messages contain information
   about the transit policies in effect across the given domain and the
   virtual gateway connectivity to adjacent domains.  Route servers in
   turn use IDPR routing information to generate policy routes between
   source and destination domains.

   There are three different procedures for distributing IDPR routing
   information:

   - The flooding protocol.  In this case, a representative policy
     gateway in each domain floods its routing information messages to
     route servers in all other domains.

   - Remote route server communication.  In this case, a route server
     distributes its domain's routing information messages to route
     servers in specific destination domains, by encapsulating these
     messages within IDPR data messages.  Thus, a domain administrator
     may control the distribution of the domain's routing information by
     restricting routing information exchange with remote route servers.
     Currently, routing information distribution restrictions are not
     included in IDPR configuration information.

   - The route server query protocol.  In this case, a policy gateway or
     route server requests routing information from another route
     server, which in turn responds with routing information from its
     database.  The route server query protocol may be used for quickly
     updating the routing information maintained by a policy gateway
     or route server that has just been connected or reconnected to an
     internetwork.  It may also be used to retrieve routing information
     from domains that restrict distribution of their routing
     information.

   In this section, we describe the flooding protocol only.  In section
   5, we describe the route server query protocol, and in section 5.2,
   we describe communication between route servers in separate domains.

   Policy gateways and route servers use CMTP for reliable transport of
   IDPR routing information messages flooded between peer, neighbor, and
   adjacent policy gateways and between those policy gateways and route
   servers.  The issuing policy gateway must communicate to CMTP the
   maximum number of transmissions per routing information message,
   flood_ret, and the interval between routing information message
   retransmissions, flood_int microseconds.  The recipient policy
   gateway or route server must determine routing information message



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   acceptability, as we describe in section 4.2.3 below.

4.1.  AD Representatives

   We designate a single policy gateway, the "AD representative", for
   generating and distributing IDPR routing information about its
   domain, to ensure that the routing information distributed is
   consistent and unambiguous and to minimize the communication required
   for routing information distribution.  There is usually only a single
   AD representative per domain, namely the lowest-numbered operational
   policy gateway in the domain.  Within a domain, policy gateways need
   no explicit election procedure to determine the AD representative.
   Instead, all members of a set of policy gateways mutually reachable
   via intra-domain routes can agree on set membership and therefore on
   which member has the lowest number.

   A partitioned domain has as many AD representatives as it does domain
   components.  In fact, the numeric identifier for an AD representative
   is identical to the numeric identifier for a domain component.  One
   cannot normally predict when and where a domain partition will occur,
   and thus any policy gateway within a domain may become an AD
   representative at any time.  To prepare for the role of AD
   representative in the event of a domain partition, every policy
   gateway must continually monitor its domain's IDPR routing
   information, through VGP and through the intra-domain routing
   procedure.

4.2.  Flooding Protocol

   An AD representative policy gateway uses unrestricted flooding among
   all domains to distribute its domain's IDPR routing information
   messages to route servers in an internetwork.  There are two kinds of
   IDPR routing information messages issued by each AD representative:
   CONFIGURATION and DYNAMIC messages.  Each CONFIGURATION message
   contains the transit policy information configured by the domain
   administrator, including for each transit policy, its identifier, its
   specification, and the sets of virtual gateways configured as
   mutually reachable via intra-domain routes supporting the given
   transit policy.  Each DYNAMIC message contains information about
   current virtual gateway connectivity to adjacent domains and about
   the sets of virtual gateways currently mutually reachable via intra-
   domain routes supporting the configured transit policies.

   The IDPR Flooding Protocol is similar to the flooding procedures
   described in [9]-[11].  Through flooding, the AD representative
   distributes its routing information messages to route servers in its
   own domain and in adjacent domains.  After generating a routing
   information message, the AD representative distributes a copy to each



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   of its peers and to a selected VG representative (see section 3.1.4)
   in all other virtual gateways connected to the domain.  Each VG
   representative in turn distributes a copy of the routing information
   message to each of its peers.  We note that distribution of routing
   information messages among virtual gateways and among peers within a
   virtual gateway is identical to distribution of inter-VG messages in
   VGP, as described in section 3.1.3.

   Within a virtual gateway, each policy gateway distributes a copy of
   the routing information message:

   - To each route server in its configured set of route servers.  A
     domain administrator should ensure that each route server not
     contained within a policy gateway appears in the set of configured
     route servers for at least two distinct policy gateways.  Hence,
     such a route server will continue to receive routing information
     messages, even when one of the policy gateways becomes unreachable.
     However, the route server will normally receive duplicate copies of
     a routing information message.

   - To certain directly-connected adjacent policy gateways.  A policy
     gateway distributes a routing information message to a
     directly-connected adjacent policy gateway in an adjacent domain
     component, only when it is the lowest-numbered operational peer
     with a direct connection to the given domain component.  We note
     that each policy gateway knows, through information provided by
     VGP, which peers have direct connections to which components of
     the adjacent domain.  If the policy gateway has direct connections
     to more than one adjacent policy gateway in that domain component,
     it selects the routing information message recipient according to
     the order in which the adjacent policy gateways appear in its
     database, choosing the first one encountered.  This selection
     procedure ensures that a copy of the routing information message
     reaches each component of the adjacent domain, while limiting the
     number of copies distributed.

   Once a routing information message reaches an adjacent policy
   gateway, that policy gateway distributes copies of the message
   throughout its domain.  The adjacent policy gateway, acting as the
   first recipient of the routing information message in its domain,
   follows the same message distribution procedure as the AD
   representative in the source domain, as described above.  The
   flooding procedure terminates when all reachable route servers in an
   internetwork receive a copy of the routing information message.

   Neighbor policy gateways may receive copies of the same routing
   information message from different adjoining domains.  If two
   neighbor policy gateways receive the message copies simultaneously,



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   they will distribute them to VG representatives in other virtual
   gateways within their domain, resulting in duplicate message
   distribution.  However, each policy gateway stops the spread of
   duplicate routing information messages as soon as it detects them, as
   described in section 4.2.3 below.  In the Internet, we expect
   simultaneous message receptions to be the exception rather than the
   rule, given the hierarchical structure of the current topology.

4.2.1.  Message Generation

   An AD representative generates and distributes a CONFIGURATION
   message whenever there is a configuration change in a transit policy
   or virtual gateway associated with its domain.  This ensures that
   route servers maintain an up-to-date view of a domain's configured
   transit policies and adjacencies.  An AD representative may also
   distribute a CONFIGURATION message at a configurable period of
   conf_per (500) hours.  A CONFIGURATION message contains, for each
   configured transit policy, the identifier assigned by the domain
   administrator, the specification, and the set of associated "virtual
   gateway groups".  Each virtual gateway group comprises virtual
   gateways configured to be mutually reachable via intra-domain routes
   of the given transit policy.  Accompanying each virtual gateway
   listed is an indication of whether the virtual gateway is configured
   to be a domain entry point, a domain exit point, or both according to
   the given transit policy.  The CONFIGURATION message also contains
   the set of local route servers that the domain administrator has
   configured to be available to IDPR clients in other domains.

   An AD representative generates and distributes a DYNAMIC message
   whenever there is a change in currently supported transit policies or
   in current virtual gateway connectivity associated with its domain.
   This ensures that route servers maintain an up-to-date view of a
   domain's supported transit policies and existing adjacencies and how
   they differ from those configured for the domain.  Specifically, an
   AD representative generates a DYNAMIC message whenever there is a
   change in the connectivity, through the given domain and with respect
   to a configured transit policy, between two components of adjoining
   domains.  An AD representative may also distribute a DYNAMIC message
   at a configurable period of dyn_per (24) hours.  A DYNAMIC message
   contains, for each configured transit policy, its identifier,
   associated virtual gateway groups, and domain components reachable
   through virtual gateways in each group.  Each DYNAMIC message also
   contains the set of currently "unavailable", either down or
   unreachable, virtual gateways in the domain.

   We note that each virtual gateway group expressed in a DYNAMIC
   message may be a proper subset of one of the corresponding virtual
   gateway groups expressed in a CONFIGURATION message.  For example,



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   suppose that, for a given domain, the virtual gateway group (VG
   A,...,VG E) were configured for a transit policy such that each
   virtual gateway was both a domain entry and exit point.  Thus, all
   virtual gateways in this group are configured to be mutually
   reachable via intra-domain routes of the given transit policy.  Now
   suppose that VG E becomes unreachable because of a power failure and
   furthermore that the remaining virtual gateways form two distinct
   groups, (VG A,VG B) and (VG C,VG D), such that although virtual
   gateways in both groups are still mutually reachable via some intra-
   domain routes they are no longer mutually reachable via any intra-
   domain routes of the given transit policy.  In this case, the virtual
   gateway groups for the given transit policy now become (VG A,VG B)
   and (VG C,VG D); VG E is listed as an unavailable virtual gateway.

   A route server uses information about the set of unavailable virtual
   gateways to determine which of its routes are no longer viable, and
   it subsequently removes such routes from its route database.
   Although route servers could determine the set of unavailable virtual
   gateways using information about configured virtual gateways and
   currently reachable virtual gateways, the associated processing cost
   is high.  In particular, a route server would have to examine all
   virtual gateway groups listed in a DYNAMIC message to determine
   whether there are any unavailable virtual gateways in the given
   domain.  To reduce the message processing at each route server, we
   have chosen to include the set of unavailable virtual gateways in
   each DYNAMIC message.

   In order to construct a DYNAMIC message, an AD representative
   assembles information gathered from intra-domain routing and from
   VGP.  Specifically, the AD representative uses the following
   information:

   - VG CONNECT and UP/DOWN messages to determine the state, up or down,
     of each of its domain's virtual gateways and the adjacent domain
     components reachable through a given virtual gateway.

   - Intra-domain routing information to determine, for each of its
     domain's transit policies, whether a given virtual gateway in the
     domain is reachable with respect to that transit policy.

   - VG POLICY messages to determine the connectivity of adjoining
     domain components, across the given domain and with respect to a
     configured transit policy, such that these components are adjacent
     to virtual gateways not currently reachable from the AD
     representative's virtual gateway according to the given transit
     policy.





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4.2.2.  Sequence Numbers

   Each IDPR routing information message carries a sequence number
   which, when used in conjunction with the timestamp carried in the
   CMTP message header, determines the recency of the message.  An AD
   representative assigns a sequence number to each routing information
   message it generates, depending upon its internal clock time:

   - The AD representative sets the sequence number to 0, if its
     internal clock time is greater than the timestamp in its previously
     generated routing information message.

   - The AD representative sets the sequence number to 1 greater than
     the sequence number in its previously generated routing information
     message, if its internal clock time equals the timestamp for its
     previously generated routing information message and if the
     previous sequence number is less than the maximum value
     (currently 2**16 - 1).  If the previous sequence number equals the
     maximum value, the AD representative waits until its internal clock
     time exceeds the timestamp in its previously generated routing
     information message and then sets the sequence number to 0.

   In general, we do not expect generation of multiple distinct IDPR
   routing information messages carrying identical timestamps, and so
   the sequence number may seem superfluous.  However, the sequence
   number may become necessary during synchronization of an AD
   representative's internal clock.  In particular, the AD
   representative may need to freeze the clock value during
   synchronization, and thus distinct sequence numbers serve to
   distinguish routing information messages generated during the clock
   synchronization interval.

4.2.3.  Message Acceptance

   Prior to a policy gateway forwarding a routing information message or
   a route server incorporating routing information into its routing
   information database, the policy gateway or route server assesses
   routing information message acceptability.  An IDPR routing
   information message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than conf_old (530) hours behind the
     recipient's internal clock time for CONFIGURATION messages and less
     than dyn_old (25) hours behind the recipient's internal clock time
     for DYNAMIC messages.

   - Its timestamp and sequence number indicate that it is more recent



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     than the currently-stored routing information from the given
     domain.  If there is no routing information currently stored from
     the given domain, then the routing information message contains, by
     default, the more recent information.

   Policy gateways acknowledge and forward acceptable IDPR routing
   information messages, according to the flooding protocol described in
   section 4.2 above.  Moreover, each policy gateway retains the
   timestamp and sequence number for the most recently accepted routing
   information message from each domain and uses these values to
   determine acceptability of routing information messages received in
   the future.  Route servers acknowledge the receipt of acceptable
   routing information messages and incorporate the contents of these
   messages into their routing information databases, contingent upon
   criteria discussed in section 4.2.4 below; however, they do not
   participate in the flooding protocol.  We note that when a policy
   gateway or route server first returns to service, it immediately
   updates its routing information database with routing information
   obtained from another route server, using the route server query
   protocol described in section 5.

   An AD representative takes special action upon receiving an
   acceptable routing information message, supposedly generated by
   itself but originally obtained from a policy gateway or route server
   other than itself.  There are at least three possible reasons for the
   occurrence of this event:

   - The routing information message has been corrupted in a way that is
     not detectable by the integrity/authentication value.

   - The AD representative has experienced a memory error.

   - Some other entity is generating routing information messages on
     behalf of the AD representative.

   In any case, the AD representative logs the event for network
   management.  Moreover, the AD representative must reestablish its own
   routing information messages as the most recent for its domain.  To
   do so, the AD representative waits until its internal clock time
   exceeds the value of the timestamp in the received routing
   information message and then generates a new routing information
   message using the currently-stored domain routing information
   supplied by VGP and by the intra-domain routing procedure.  Note that
   the length of time the AD representative must wait to generate the
   new message is at most cmtp_new (300) seconds, the maximum CMTP-
   tolerated difference between the received message's timestamp and the
   AD representative's internal clock time.




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   IDPR routing information messages that pass the CMTP validity checks
   but appear less recent than stored routing information are
   unacceptable.  Policy gateways do not forward unacceptable routing
   information messages, and route servers do not incorporate the
   contents of unacceptable routing information messages into their
   routing information databases.  Instead, the recipient of an
   unacceptable routing information message acknowledges the message in
   one of two ways:

   - If the routing information message timestamp and sequence number
     equal to the timestamp and sequence number associated with the
     stored routing information for the given domain, the recipient
     assumes that the routing information message is a duplicate and
     acknowledges the message.

   - If the routing information message timestamp and sequence number
     indicate that the message is less recent than the stored routing
     information for the domain, the recipient acknowledges the message
     with an indication that the routing information it contains is
     out-of-date.  Such a negative acknowledgement is a signal to the
     sender of the routing information message to request more up-to-
     date routing information from a route server, using the route
     server query protocol.  Furthermore, if the recipient of the out-
     of-date routing information message is a route server, it
     regenerates a routing information message from its own routing
     information database and forwards the message to the sender.  The
     sender may in turn propagate this more recent routing information
     message to other policy gateways and route servers.

4.2.4.  Message Incorporation

   A route server usually stores the entire contents of an acceptable
   IDPR routing information message in its routing information database,
   so that it has access to all advertised transit policies when
   generating a route and so that it can regenerate routing information
   messages at a later point in time if requested to do so by another
   route server or policy gateway.  However, a route server may elect
   not to store all routing information message contents.  In
   particular, the route server need not store any transit policy that
   excludes the route server's domain as a source or any routing
   information from a domain that the route server's domain's source
   policies exclude for transit.  Selective storing of routing
   information message contents simplifies the route generation
   procedure since it reduces the search space of possible routes, and
   it limits the amount of route server memory devoted to routing
   information.  However, selective storing of routing information also
   means that the route server cannot always regenerate the original
   routing information message, if requested to do so by another route



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   server or policy gateway.

   An acceptable IDPR routing information message may contain transit
   policy information that is not well-defined according to the route
   server's perception.  A CONFIGURATION message may contain an
   unrecognized domain, virtual gateway, or transit policy attribute,
   such as user class access restrictions or offered service.  In this
   case, "unrecognized" means that the value in the routing information
   message is not listed in the route server's configuration database,
   as described previously in section 1.8.2.  A DYNAMIC message may
   contain an unrecognized transit policy or virtual gateway.  In this
   case, "unrecognized" means that the transit policy or virtual gateway
   was not listed in the most recent CONFIGURATION message for the given
   domain.

   Each route server can always parse an acceptable routing information
   messsage, even if some of the information is not well-defined, and
   thus can always use the information that it does recognize.
   Therefore, a route server can store the contents of acceptable
   routing information messages from domains in which it is interested,
   regardless of whether all contents appear to be well-defined at
   present.  If a routing message contains unrecognized information, the
   route server may attempt to obtain the additional information it
   needs to decipher the unrecognized information.  For a CONFIGURATION
   message, the route server logs the event for network management; for
   a DYNAMIC message, the route server requests, from another route
   server, the most recent CONFIGURATION message for the domain in
   question.

   When a domain is partitioned, each domain component has its own AD
   representative, which generates routing information messages on
   behalf of that component.  Discovery of a domain partition prompts
   the AD representative for each domain component to generate and
   distribute a DYNAMIC message.  In this case, a route server receives
   and stores more than one routing information message at a time for
   the given domain, namely one for each domain component.

   When the partition heals, the AD representative for the entire domain
   generates and distributes a DYNAMIC message.  In each route server's
   routing information database, the new DYNAMIC message does not
   automatically replace all of the currently-stored DYNAMIC messages
   for the given domain.  Instead, the new message only replaces that
   message whose AD representative matches the AD representative for the
   new message.  The other DYNAMIC messages, generated during the period
   over which the partition occurred, remain in the routing information
   database until they attain their maximum lifetime, as described in
   section 4.2.5 below.  Such stale information may lead to the
   generation of routes that result in path setup failures and hence the



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   selection of alternative routes.  To reduce the chances of path setup
   failures, we will investigate, for a future version of IDPR,
   mechanisms for removing partition-related DYNAMIC messages
   immediately after a partition disappears.

4.2.5.  Routing Information Database

   We expect that most of the IDPR routing information stored in a
   routing information database will remain viable for long periods of
   time, perhaps until a domain reconfiguration occurs.  By "viable", we
   mean that the information reflects the current state of the domain
   and hence may be used successfully for generating policy routes.  To
   reduce the probability of retaining stale routing information, a
   route server imposes a maximum lifetime on each database entry,
   initialized when it incorporates an accepted entry into its routing
   information database.  The maximum lifetime should be longer than the
   corresponding message generation period, so that the database entry
   is likely to be refreshed before it attains its maximum lifetime.

   Each CONFIGURATION message stored in the routing information database
   has a maximum lifetime of conf_old (530) hours; each DYNAMIC message
   stored in the routing information database has a maximum lifetime of
   dyn_old (25) hours.  Periodic generation of routing information
   messages makes it unlikely that any routing information message will
   remain in a routing information database for its full lifetime.
   However, a routing information message may attain its maximum
   lifetime in a route server that is separated from a internetwork for
   a long period of time.

   When an IDPR routing information message attains its maximum lifetime
   in a routing information database, the route server removes the
   message contents from its database, so that it will not generate new
   routes with the outdated routing information nor distribute old
   routing information in response to requests from other route servers
   or policy gateways.  Nevertheless, the route server continues to
   dispense routes previously generated with the old routing
   information, as long as path setup (see section 7) for these routes
   succeeds.

   The route server treats routing information message lifetime
   expiration differently, depending on the type of routing information
   message.  When a CONFIGURATION message expires, the route server
   requests, from another route server, the most recent CONFIGURATION
   message issued for the given domain.  When a DYNAMIC message expires,
   the route server does not initially attempt to obtain more recent
   routing information.  Instead, if route generation is necessary, the
   route server uses the routing information contained in the
   corresponding CONFIGURATION message for the given domain.  Only if



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   there is a path setup failure (see section 7.4) involving the given
   domain does the route server request, from another route server, the
   most recent DYNAMIC message issued for the given domain.

4.3.  Routing Information Message Formats

   The flooding protocol number is equal to 1.  We describe the contents
   of each type of routing information message below.

4.3.1.  CONFIGURATION

   The CONFIGURATION message type is equal to 0.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            AD CMP             |              SEQ              |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM TP             |            NUM RS             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              RS               |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each transit policy configured for the domain:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |            NUM ATR            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each attribute of the transit policy:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ATR TYP            |            ATR LEN            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For the source/destination access restrictions attribute:
   +-------------------------------+
   |          NUM AD GRP           |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each domain group in the source/destination access restrictions:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM AD             |              AD               |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |    AD FLGS    |    NUM HST    |            HST SET            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   For the temporal access restrictions attribute:
   +-------------------------------+
   |            NUM TIM            |
   +-------------------------------+







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   For each set of times in the temporal access restrictions:
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |   TIM FLGS    |                   DURATION                    |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |                             START                             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            PERIOD             |            ACTIVE             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For the user class access restrictions attribute:
   +-------------------------------+
   |            NUM UCI            |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each UCI in the user class access restrictions:
   +---------------+
   |      UCI      |
   +---------------+
   For each offered service attribute:
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            OFR SRV                            |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   For the virtual gateway access restrictions attribute:
   +-------------------------------+
   |           NUM VG GRP          |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each virtual gateway group in the virtual gateway access
   restrictions:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM VG             |            ADJ AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |      VG       |    VG FLGS    |
   +---------------+---------------+

   AD CMP
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain component containing
        the AD representative policy gateway.

   SEQ (16 bits) Routing information message sequence number.

   NUM TP (16 bits) Number of transit policy specifications contained in
        the routing information message.

   NUM RS (16 bits) Number of route servers advertised to serve clients
        outside of the domain.

   RS (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a route server.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy specification.




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   NUM ATR (16 bits) Number of attributes associated with the transit
        policy.

   ATR TYP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a type of attribute.  Valid
        attributes include the following types:

   - Set of  virtual  gateway access restrictions   (see  section 1.4.2)
     associated with the transit policy (variable).  This attribute must
     be included.

   - Set of source/destination access restrictions (see section 1.4.2)
     associated with the transit policy (variable).  This attribute may
     be omitted.  Absence of this attribute implies that traffic from
     any source to any destination is acceptable.

   - Set of temporal access restrictions (see section 1.4.2) associated
     with the transit policy (variable).  This attribute may be omitted.
     Absence of this attribute implies that the transit policy applies
     at all times.

   - Set of user class access restrictions (see section 1.4.2)
     associated with the transit policy (variable).  This attribute may
     be omitted.  Absence of this attribute implies that traffic from
     any user class is acceptable.

   - Average delay in milliseconds (16 bits).  This attribute may be
     omitted.

   - Delay variation in milliseconds (16 bits).  This attribute may be
     omitted.

   - Average available bandwidth in bits per second (48 bits).  This
     attribute may be omitted.

   - Available bandwidth variation in bits per second (48 bits).  This
     attribute may be omitted.

   - MTU in bytes (16 bits).  This attribute may be omitted.

   - Charge per byte in thousandths of a cent (16 bits). This attribute
     may be omitted.

   - Charge per message in thousandths of a cent (16 bits).  This
     attribute may be omitted.

   - Charge for session time in thousandths of a cent per second (16
     bits).  This attribute may be omitted.  Absence of any charge
     attribute implies that the domain provides free transit service.



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   ATR LEN (16 bits) Length of an attribute in bytes, beginning with the
   subsequent field.

   NUM AD GRP (16 bits) Number of source/destination domain groups (see
   section 1.4.2) associated with the source/destination access
   restrictions.

   NUM AD (16 bits) Number of domains or sets of domains in a domain
   group.

   AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a domain or domain set.

   AD FLGS (8 bits) Set of five flags indicating how to interpret the AD
   field, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding left to right,
   the first flag indicates whether the transit policy applies to all
   domains or to specific domains (1 all, 0 specific), and when set to
   1, causes the second and third flags to be ignored.  The second flag
   indicates whether the domain identifier signifies a single domain or
   a domain set (1 single, 0 set).  The third flag indicates whether the
   transit policy applies to the given domain or domain set (1 applies,
   0 does not apply) and is used for representing complements of sets of
   domains.  The fourth flag indicates whether the domain is a source (1
   source, 0 not source).  The fifth flag indicates whether the domain
   is a destination (1 destination, 0 not destination).  At least one of
   the fourth and fifth flags must be set to 1.

   NUM HST (8 bits) Number of "host sets" (see section 1.4.2) associated
   with a particular domain or domain set.  The value 0 indicates that
   all hosts in the given domain or domain set are acceptable sources or
   destinations, as specified by the fourth and fifth AD flags.

   HST SET (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a host set.

   NUM TIM (16 bits) Number of time specifications associated with the
   temporal access restrictions.  Each time specification is split into
   a set of continguous identical periods, as we describe below.

   TIM FLGS (8 bits) Set of two flags indicating how to combine the time
   specifications, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding left to
   right, the first flag indicates whether the transit policy applies
   during the periods specified in the time specification (1 applies, 0
   does not apply) and is used for representing complements of policy
   applicability intervals.  The second flag indicates whether the time
   specification takes precedence over the previous time specifications
   listed (1 precedence, 0 no precedence).  Precedence is equivalent to
   the boolean OR and AND operators, in the following sense.  At any
   given instant, a transit policy either applies or does not apply,
   according to a given time specification, and we can assign a boolean



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   value to the state of policy applicability according to a given time
   specification.  If the second flag assumes the value 1 for a given
   time specification, that indicates the boolean operator OR should be
   applied to the values of policy applicability, according to the given
   time specification and to all previously listed time specifications.
   If the second flag assumes the value 0 for a given time
   specification, that indicates the boolean operator AND should be
   applied to the values of policy applicability, according to the given
   time specification and to all previously listed time specifications.

   DURATION (24 bits) Length of the time specification duration, in
   minutes.  A value of 0 indicates an infinite duration.

   START (32 bits) Time at which the time specification first takes
   effect, in seconds elapsed since 1 January 1970 0:00 GMT.

   PERIOD (16 bits) Length of each time period within the time
   specification, in minutes.

   ACTIVE (16 bits) Length of the policy applicable interval during each
   time period, in minutes from the beginning of the time period.

   NUM UCI (16 bits) Number of user classes associated with the user
   class access restrictions.

   UCI (8 bits) Numeric identifier for a user class.

   NUM VG GRP (16 bits) Number of virtual gateway groups (see section
   1.4.2) associated with the virtual gateway access restrictions.

   NUM VG (16 bits) Number of virtual gateways in a virtual gateway
   group.

   ADJ AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain to which
   a virtual gateway connects.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for a virtual gateway.

   VG FLGS (8 bits) Set of two flags indicating how to interpret the VG
   field, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding left to right,
   the first flag indicates whether the virtual gateway is a domain
   entry point (1 entry, 0 not entry).  The second flag indicates
   whether the virtual gateway is a domain exit point (1 exit, 0 not
   exit).  At least one of the first and second flags must be set to 1.







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4.3.2.  DYNAMIC

   The DYNAMIC message type is equal to 1.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            AD CMP             |              SEQ              |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |           UNAVL VG            |            NUM PS             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   For each unavailable virtual gateway in the domain:
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            ADJ AD             |      VG       |    UNUSED     |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   For each set of transit policies for the domain:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM TP             |          NUM VG GRP           |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each virtual gateway group associated with the transit policy
   set:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM VG             |            ADJ AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |      VG       |    VG FLGS    |            NUM CMP            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ CMP            |
   +-------------------------------+

   AD CMP
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain component containing
        the AD representative policy gateway.

   SEQ (16 bits) Routing information message sequence number.

   UNAVL VG (16 bits) Number of virtual gateways in the domain component
        that are currently unavailable via any intra-domain routes.

   NUM PS (16 bits) Number of sets of transit policies listed.  Transit
        policy sets provide a mechanism for reducing the size of DYNAMIC
        messages.  A single set of virtual gateway groups applies to all
        transit policies in a given set.

   ADJ AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain to which
        a virtual gateway connects.




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   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for a virtual gateway.

   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

   NUM TP (16 bits) Number of transit policies in a set.

   NUM VGGRP (16 bits) Number of virtual gateway groups currently
        associated with the transit policy set.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy.

   NUM VG (16 bits) Number of virtual gateways in a virtual gateway
        group.

   VG FLGS (8 bits) Set of two flags indicating how to interpret the VG
        field, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding left to
        right, the first flag indicates whether the virtual gateway is a
        domain entry point (1 entry, 0 not entry).  The second flag
        indicates whether the virtual gateway is a domain exit point (1
        exit, 0 not exit).  At least one of the first and second flags
        must be set to 1.

   NUM CMP (16 bits) Number of adjacent domain components reachable via
        direct connections through the virtual gateway.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a reachable adjacent domain
        component.

4.3.3.  Negative Acknowledgements

   When a policy gateway or route server receives an unacceptable IDPR
   routing information message that passes the CMTP validation checks,
   it includes, in its CMTP ACK, an appropriate negative
   acknowledgement.  This information is placed in the INFORM field of
   the CMTP ACK (described previously in section 2.4); the numeric
   identifier for each type of routing information message negative
   acknowledgement is contained in the left-most 8 bits of the INFORM
   field.  Negative acknowledgements associated with routing information
   messages include the following types:

   1.  Unrecognized IDPR routing information message type.  Numeric
       identifier for the unrecognized message type (8 bits).

   2.  Out-of-date IDPR routing information message.  This is a signal
       to the sender that it may not have the most recent routing
       information for the given domain.





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5.  Route Server Query Protocol

   Each route server is responsible for maintaining both the routing
   information database and the route database and for responding to
   database information requests from policy gateways and other route
   servers.  These requests and their responses are the messages
   exchanged via the Route Server Query Protocol (RSQP).

   Policy gateways and route servers normally invoke RSQP to replace
   absent, outdated, or corrupted information in their own routing
   information or route databases.  In section 4, we discussed some of
   the situations in which RSQP may be invoked; in this section and in
   section 7, we discuss other such situations.

5.1.  Message Exchange

   Policy gateways and route servers use CMTP for reliable transport of
   route server requests and responses.  RSQP must communicate to CMTP
   the maximum number of transmissions per request/response message,
   rsqp_ret, and the interval between request/response message
   retransmissions, rsqp_int microseconds.  A route server
   request/response message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than rsqp_old (300) seconds behind the
     recipient's internal clock time.

   With RSQP, a requesting entity expects to receive an acknowledgement
   from the queried route server indicating whether the route server can
   accommodate the request.  The route server may fail to fill a given
   request for either of the following reasons:

   - Its corresponding database contains no entry or only a partial
     entry for the requested information.

   - It is governed by special message distribution rules, imposed by
     the domain administrator, that preclude it from releasing the
     requested information.  Currently, such distribution rules are not
     included in IDPR configuration information.

   For all requests that it cannot fill, the route server responds with
   a negative acknowledgement message carried in a CMTP acknowledgement,
   indicating the set of unfulfilled requests (see section 5.5.4).

   If the requesting entity either receives a negative acknowledgement
   or does not receive any acknowledgement after rsqp_ret attempts
   directed at the same route server, it queries a different route



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   server, as long as the number of attempted requests to different
   route servers does not exceed rsqp_try (3).  Specifically, the
   requesting entity proceeds in round-robin order through its list of
   addressable route servers.  However, if the requesting entity is
   unsuccessful after rsqp_try attempts, it abandons the request
   altogether and logs the event for network management.

   A policy gateway or a route server can request information from any
   route server that it can address.  Addresses for local route servers
   within a domain are part of the configuration for each IDPR entity
   within a domain; addresses for remote route servers in other domains
   are obtained through flooded CONFIGURATION messages, as described
   previously in section 4.2.1.  However, requesting entities always
   query local route servers before remote route servers, in order to
   contain the costs associated with the query and response.  If the
   requesting entity and the queried route server are in the same
   domain, they can communicate over intra-domain routes, whereas if the
   requesting entity and the queried route server are in different
   domains, they must obtain a policy route and establish a path before
   they can communicate, as we describe below.

5.2.  Remote Route Server Communication

   RSQP communication involving a remote route server requires a policy
   route and accompanying path setup (see section 7) between the
   requesting and queried entities, as these entities reside in
   different domains.  After generating a request message, the
   requesting entity hands to CMTP its request message along with the
   remote route server's entity and domain identifiers.  CMTP encloses
   the request in a DATAGRAM and hands the DATAGRAM and remote route
   server information to the path agent.  Using the remote route server
   information, the path agent obtains, and if necessary sets up, a path
   to the remote route server.  Once the path to the remote route server
   has been successfully established, the path agent encapsulates the
   DATAGRAM within an IDPR data message and forwards the data message
   along the designated path.

   When the path agent in the remote route server receives the IDPR data
   message, it extracts the DATAGRAM and hands it to CMTP.  In addition,
   the path agent, using the requesting entity and domain identifiers
   contained in the path identifier, obtains, and if necessary sets up,
   a path back to the requesting entity.

   If the DATAGRAM fails any of the CMTP validation checks, CMTP returns
   a NAK to the requesting entity.  If the DATAGRAM passes all of the
   CMTP validation checks, the remote route server assesses the
   acceptability of the request message.  Provided the request message
   is acceptable, the remote route server determines whether it can



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   fulfill the request and directs CMTP to return an ACK to the
   requesting entity.  The ACK may contain a negative acknowledgement if
   the entire request cannot be fulfilled.

   The remote route server generates responses for all requests that it
   can fulfill and returns the responses to the requesting entity.
   Specifically, the remote route server hands to CMTP its response and
   the requesting entity information.  CMTP in turn encloses the
   response in a DATAGRAM.

   When returning an ACK, a NAK, or a response to the requesting entity,
   the remote route server hands the corresponding CMTP message and
   requesting entity information to the path agent.  Using the
   requesting entity information, the path agent retrieves the path to
   the requesting entity, encapsulates the CMTP message within an IDPR
   data message, and forwards the data message along the designated
   path.

   When the path agent in the requesting entity receives the IDPR data
   message, it extracts the ACK, NAK, or response to its request and
   performs the CMTP validation checks for that message.  In the case of
   a response messsage, the requesting entity also assesses message
   acceptability before incorporating the contents into the appropriate
   database.

5.3  Routing Information

   Policy gateways and route servers request routing information from
   route servers, in order to update their routing information
   databases.  To obtain routing information from a route server, the
   requesting entity issues a ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST message
   containing the type of routing information requested - CONFIGURATION
   messages, DYNAMIC messages, or both - and the set of domains from
   which the routing information is requested.

   Upon receiving a ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST message, a route server
   first assesses message acceptability before proceeding to act on the
   contents.  If the ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST message is deemed
   acceptable, the route server determines how much of the request it
   can fulfill and then instructs CMTP to generate an acknowledgement,
   indicating its ability to fulfill the request.  The route server
   proceeds to fulfill as much of the request as possible by
   reconstructing individual routing information messages, one per
   requested message type and domain, from its routing information
   database.  We note that only a regenerated routing information
   message whose entire contents match that of the original routing
   information message may pass the CMTP integrity/authentication
   checks.



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5.4.  Routes

   Path agents request routes from route servers when they require
   policy routes for path setup.  To obtain routes from a route server,
   the requesting path agent issues a ROUTE REQUEST message containing
   the destination domain and applicable service requirements, the
   maximum number of routes requested, a directive indicating whether to
   generate the routes or retrieve them from the route database, and a
   directive indicating whether to refresh the routing information
   database with the most recent CONFIGURATION or DYNAMIC message from a
   given domain, before generating the routes.  To refresh its routing
   information database, a route server must obtain routing information
   from another route server.  The path agent usually issues routing
   information database refresh directives in response to a failed path
   setup.  We discuss the application of these directives in more detail
   in section 7.4.

   Upon receiving a ROUTE REQUEST message, a route server first assesses
   message acceptability before proceeding to act on the contents.  If
   the ROUTE REQUEST message is deemed acceptable, the route server
   determines whether it can fulfill the request and then instructs CMTP
   to generate an acknowledgement, indicating its ability to fulfill the
   request.  The route server proceeds to fulfill the request with
   policy routes, either retrieved from its route database or generated
   from its routing information database if necessary, and returns these
   routes in a ROUTE RESPONSE message.

5.5.  Route Server Message Formats

   The route server query protocol number is equal to 2.  We describe
   the contents of each type of RSQP message below.

5.5.1.  ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST

   The ROUTING INFORMATION REQUEST message type is equal to 0.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            QRY AD             |            QRY RS             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM AD             |              AD               |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |   RIM FLGS    |    UNUSED     |
   +---------------+---------------+

   QRY AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain containing the



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        queried route server.

   QRY RS (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the queried route server.

   NUM AD (16 bits) Number of domains about which routing information is
        requested.  The value 0 indicates a request for routing
        information from all domains.

   AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a domain.  This field is absent
        when NUM AD equals 0.

   RIM FLGS (8 bits) Set of two flags indicating the type of routing
        information messages requested, contained in the right-most
        bits.  Proceeding left to right, the first flag indicates
        whether the request is for a CONFIGURATION message (1
        CONFIGURATION, 0 no CONFIGURATION).  The second flag indicates
        whether the request is for a DYNAMIC message (1 DYNAMIC, 0 no
        DYNAMIC).  At least one of the first and second flags must be
        set to 1.

   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

5.5.2.  ROUTE REQUEST

        The ROUTE REQUEST message type is equal to 1.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            QRY AD             |            QRY RS             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            SRC AD             |            HST SET            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |      UCI      |    UNUSED     |            NUM RQS            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            DST AD             |            PRX AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |    NUM RTS    |   GEN FLGS    |            RFS AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            NUM AD             |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each domain to be favored, avoided, or excluded:
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
   |              AD               |    AD FLGS    |    UNUSED     |
   +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+






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   For each requested service:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            RQS TYP            |            RQS LEN            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |                            RQS SRV                            |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+

   QRY AD
        (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain containing the
        queried route server.

   QRY RS (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the queried route server.

   SRC AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the route's source domain.

   HST SET (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the source's host set.

   UCI (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the source user class. The value
        0 indicates that there is no particular source user class.

   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

   NUM RQS (16 bits) Number of requested services.  The value 0
        indicates that the source requests no special services.

   DST AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the route's destination
        domain.

   PRX AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the destination domain's
        proxy (see section 1.3.1).  If the destination domain provides
        the path agent function for its hosts, then the destination and
        proxy domains are identical.  A route server constructs routes
        between the source domain's proxy and the destination domain's
        proxy.  We note that the source domain's proxy is identical to
        the domain issuing the CMTP message containing the ROUTE REQUEST
        message, and hence available in the CMTP header.

   NUM RTS (8 bits) Number of policy routes requested.

   GEN FLGS (8 bits) Set of three flags indicating how to obtain the
        requested routes, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding
        left to right, the first flag indicates whether the route server
        should retrieve existing routes from its route database or
        generate new routes (1 retrieve, 0 generate).  The second flag
        indicates whether the route server should refresh its routing
        information database before generating the requested routes (1
        refresh, 0 no refresh) and when set to 1, causes the third flag
        and the RFS AD field to become significant.  The third flag



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        indicates whether the routing information database refresh
        should include CONFIGURATION messages or DYNAMIC messages (1
        configuration, 0 dynamic).

   RFS AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the domain for which routing
        information should be refreshed.  This field is meaningful only
        if the second flag in the GEN FLGS field is set to 1.

   NUM AD (16 bits) Number of transit domains that are to be favored,
        avoided, or excluded during route selection (see section 1.4.1).

   AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit domain to be favored,
        avoided, or excluded.

   AD FLGS (8 bits) Three flags indicating how to interpret the AD
        field, contained in the right-most bits.  Proceeding left to
        right, the first flag indicates whether the domain should be
        favored (1 favored, 0 not favored).  The second flag indicates
        whether the domain should be avoided (1 avoided, 0 not avoided).
        The third flag indicates whether the domain should be excluded
        (1 excluded, 0 not excluded).  No more than one of the first,
        second, and third flags must set to 1.

   RQS TYP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a type of requested service.
        Valid requested services include the following types:

   1.  Upper bound on delay, in milliseconds (16 bits).  This attribute
       may be omitted.

   2.  Minimum delay route.  This attribute may be omitted.

   3.  Upper bound on delay variation, in milliseconds (16 bits).  This
       attribute may be omitted.

   4.  Minimum delay variation route.  This attribute may be omitted.

   5.  Lower bound on bandwidth, in bits per second (48 bits).  This
       attribute may be omitted.

   6.  Maximum bandwidth route.  This attribute may be omitted.

   7.  Upper bound on monetary cost, in cents (32 bits).  This attribute
       may be omitted.

   8.  Minimum monetary cost route.  This attribute may be omitted.

   9.  Path lifetime in minutes (16 bits). This attribute may be omitted
       but must be present if types 7 or 8 are present. Route servers



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       use path lifetime information together with domain charging
       method to compute expected session monetary cost over a given
       domain.

   10. Path lifetime in messages (16 bits).  This attribute may be
       omitted but must be present if types 7 or 8 are present.

   11. Path lifetime in bytes (48 bits).  This attribute may be omitted
       but must be present if types 7 or 8 are present.

   RQS LEN
        (16 bits) Length of the requested service, in bytes, beginning
        with the next field.

   RQS SRV
        (variable) Description of the requested service.

5.5.3.  ROUTE RESPONSE

   The ROUTE RESPONSE message type is equal to 2.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    NUM RTS    |
   +---------------+
   For each route provided:
   +---------------+---------------+
   |    NUM AD     |   RTE FLGS    |
   +---------------+---------------+
   For each domain in the route:
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |    AD LEN     |      VG       |            ADJ AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ CMP            |            NUM TP             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |
   +-------------------------------+

   NUM RTS
        (16 bits) Number of policy routes provided.

   RTE FLGS (8 bits) Set of two flags indicating the directions in which
        a route can be used, contained in the right-most bits.  Refer to
        sections 6.2, 7, and 7.2 for detailed discussions of path
        directionality.  Proceeding left to right, the first flag
        indicates whether the route can be used from source to
        destination (1 from source, 0 not from source).  The second flag



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        indicates whether the route can be used from destination to
        source (1 from destination, 0 not from destination).  At least
        one of the first and second flags must be set to 1, if NUM RTS
        is greater than 0.

   NUM AD (8 bits) Number of domains in the policy route, not including
        the first domain on the route.

   AD LEN (8 bits) Length of the information associated with a
        particular domain, in bytes, beginning with the next field.


   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for an exit virtual gateway.

   ADJ AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain connected
        to the virtual gateway.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the adjacent domain
        component.  Used by policy gateways to select a route across a
        virtual gateway connecting to a partitioned domain.

   NUM TP (16 bits) Number of transit policies that apply to the section
        of the route traversing the domain component.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy.

5.5.4.  Negative Acknowledgements

   When a policy gateway receives an unacceptable RSQP message that
   passes the CMTP validation checks, it includes, in its CMTP ACK, an
   appropriate negative acknowledgement.  This information is placed in
   the INFORM field of the CMTP ACK (described previously in section
   2.4); the numeric identifier for each type of RSQP negative
   acknowledgement is contained in the left-most 8 bits of the INFORM
   field.  Negative acknowledgements associated with RSQP include the
   following types:

   1.  Unrecognized RSQP message type.  Numeric identifier for the
       unrecognized message type (8 bits).

   2.  Out-of-date RSQP message.

   3.  Unable to fill requests for routing information from the
       following domains.  Number of domains for which requests cannot
       be filled (16 bits); a value of 0 indicates that the route
       server cannot fill any of the requests.  Numeric identifier for
       each domain for which a request cannot be filled (16 bits).




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   4.  Unable to fill requests for routes to the following destination
       domain.  Numeric identifier for the destination domain (16 bits).

6.  Route Generation

   Route generation is the most computationally complex part of IDPR,
   because of the number of domains and the number and heterogeneity of
   policies that it must accommodate.  Route servers must generate
   policy routes that satisfy the requested services of the source
   domains and respect the offered services of the transit domains.

   We distinguish requested qualities of service and route generation
   with respect to them as follows:

  - Requested service limits include upper bounds on route delay, route
    delay variation, and session monetary cost and lower bounds on
    available route bandwidth.  Generating a route that must satisfy
    more than one quality of service constraint, for example route delay
    of no more than X seconds and available route bandwidth of no less
    than Y bits per second, is an NP-complete problem.

  - Optimal requested  services  include  minimum  route delay, minimum
    route delay variation, minimum session monetary cost, and maximum
    available route bandwidth.  In the worst case, the computational
    complexity of generating a route that is optimal with respect to a
    given requested service is O((N + L) log N) for Dijkstra's shortest
    path first (SPF) search and O(N + (L * L)) for breadth-first (BF)
    search, where N is the number of nodes and L is the number of links
    in the search graph.  Multi-criteria optimization, for example
    finding a route with minimal delay variation and minimal session
    monetary cost, may be defined in several ways.  One approach to
    multi-criteria optimization is to assign each link a single value
    equal to a weighted sum of the values of the individual offered
    qualities of service and generate a route that is optimal with
    respect to this new criterion.  However, selecting the weights that
    yield the desired route generation behavior is itself an
    optimization procedure and hence not trivial.

To help contain the combinatorial explosion of processing and memory
costs associated with route generation, we supply the following
guidelines for generation of suitable policy routes:

  - Each route server should only generate policy routes from the
    perspective of its own domain as source; it need not generate policy
    routes for arbitrary source/destination domain pairs.  Thus, we can
    distribute the computational burden over all route servers.

  - Route servers should precompute routes for which they anticipate



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    requests and should generate routes on demand only in order to
    satisfy unanticipated route requests.  Hence, a single route server
    can distribute its computational burden over time.

  - Route servers should cache the results of route generation, in order
    to minimize the computation associated with responding to future
    route requests.

  - To handle requested service limits, a route server should always
    select the first route generated that satisfies all of the requested
    service limits.

  - To handle multi-criteria optimization in route selection, a route
    server should generate routes that are optimal with respect to the
    first optimal requested service listed in the ROUTE REQUEST message.
    The route server should resolve ties between otherwise equivalent
    routes by evaluating these routes according to the other optimal
    requested services contained in the ROUTE REQUEST message, in the
    order in which they are listed.  With respect to the route server's
    routing information database, the selected route is optimal
    according to the first optimal requested service listed in the ROUTE
    REQUEST message but is not necessarily optimal according to any
    other optimal requested service listed in the ROUTE REQUEST message.

    ti 2 - To handle a mixture of requested service limits and optimal
    requested services, a route server should generate routes that
    satisfy all of the requested service limits.  The route server
    should resolve ties between otherwise equivalent routes by
    evaluating these routes as described in the multi-criteria
    optimization case above.

    ti 2 - All else being equal, a route server should always prefer
    minimum-hop routes, because they minimize the amount of network
    resources consumed by the routes.

    ti 2 - A route server should generate at least one route to each
    component of a partitioned destination domain, because it may not
    know in which domain component the destination host resides.  Hence,
    a route server can maximize the chances of providing a feasible
    route to a destination within a partitioned domain.

6.1  Searching

    All domains need not execute the identical route generation
    procedure.  Each domain administrator is free to specify the IDPR
    route generation procedure for route servers in its own domain,
    making the procedure as simple or as complex as desired.




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    We offer an IDPR route generation procedure as a model.  With slight
    modification, this procedure can be made to search in either BF or
    SPF order.  The procedure can be used either to generate a single
    policy route from the source to a specified destination domain or to
    generate a set of policy routes from the source domain to all
    destination domains.  If the source or destination domain has a
    proxy, then the source or destination endpoint of the policy route
    is a proxy domain and not the actual source or destination domain.

    For high-bandwidth traffic flows, BF search is the recommended
    search technique, because it produces minimum-hop routes.  For low-
    bandwidth traffic flows, the route server may use either BF search
    or SPF search.  The computational complexity of BF search is O(N +
    L) and hence it is the search procedure of choice, except when
    generating routes with optimal requested services.  We recommend
    using SPF search only for optimal requested services and never in
    response to a request for a maximum bandwidth route.

6.1.1.  Implementation

   Data Structures:

   The routing information database contains the graph of an
   internetwork, in which virtual gateways are the nodes and intra-
   domain routes between virtual gateways are the links.  During route
   generation, each route is represented as a sequence of virtual
   gateways, domains, and relevant transit policies, together with a
   list of route characteristics, stored in a temporary array and
   indexed by destination domain.

   - Execute the Policy Consistency routine, first with the source
     domain the given domain and second with the destination domain as
     the given domain.  If any policy inconsistency precludes the
     requested traffic flow, go to Exit.

   - For each domain, initialize a null route, set the route bandwidth
     to and set the following route characteristics to infinity: route
     delay, route delay variation, session monetary cost, and route
     length in hops.

   - With each operational virtual gateway in the source or source proxy
     domain, associate the initial route characteristics.

   - Initialize a next-node data structure which will contain, for each
     route in progress, the virtual gateway at the current endpoint of
     the route together with the associated route characteristics.  The
     next-node data structure determines the order in which routes get
     expanded.



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        BF:  A fifo queue.

        SPF: A heap, ordered according to the first optimal requested
             service listed in the ROUTE REQUEST message.

   Remove Next Node: These steps are performed for each virtual gateway
        in the next-node data structure.

      - If there are no more virtual gateways in the next-node data
        structure, go to Exit.

      - Extract a virtual gateway and its associated route
        characteristics from the next-node data structure, obtain the
        adjacent domain, and:

             SPF: Remake the heap.

      - If there is a specific destination domain and if for the primary
        optimal service:

             BF:  Route length in hops.

             SPF: First optimal requested service listed in the ROUTE
             REQUEST message.

        the extracted virtual gateway's associated route characteristic
        is no better than that of the destination domain, go to Remove
        Next Node.

      - Execute the Policy Consistency routine with the adjacent domain
        as given domain.  If any policy inconsistency precludes the
        requested traffic flow, go to Remove Next Node.

      - Check that the source domain's transit policies do not preclude
        traffic generated by members of the source host set with the
        specified user class and requested services, from flowing to the
        adjacent domain as destination.  This check is necessary because
        the route server caches what it considers to be all feasible
        routes, to intermediate destination domains, generated during
        the computation of the requested route.  If there are no policy
        inconsistencies, associate the route and its characteristics
        with the adjacent domain as destination.

      - If there is a specific destination domain and if the adjacent
        domain is the destination or destination proxy domain, go to
        Remove Next Node.

      - Record the set of all exit virtual gateways in the adjacent



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        domain which the adjacent domain's transit policies permit the
        requested traffic flow and which are currently reachable from
        the entry virtual gateway.

   Next Node:

        These steps are performed for all exit virtual gateways in the
        above set.

      - If there are no exit virtual gateways in the set, go to Remove
        Next Node.

      - Compute the characteristics for the route to the exit virtual
        gateway, and check that all of the route characteristics are
        within the requested service limits.  If any of the route
        characteristics are outside of these limits, go to Next Node.

      - Compare these route characteristics with those already
        associated with the exit virtual gateway (there may be none, if
        this is the first time the exit virtual gateway has been visited
        in the search), according to the primary optimal service.

      - Select the route with the optimal value of the primary optimal
        service, resolve ties by considering optimality according to any
        other optimal requested services in the order in which they are
        listed in the ROUTE REQUEST message, and associate the selected
        route and its characteristics with the exit virtual gateway.

      - Add the virtual gateway to the next-node structure:

             BF:  Add to the end of the fifo queue.

             SPF: Add to the heap.

             and go to Next Node.

   Exit:
        Return a response to the route request, consisting of either a
        set of candidate policy routes or an indication that the route
        request cannot be fulfilled.

   Policy Consistency: Check policy consistency for the given domain.

      - Check that the given domain is not specified as an excluded
        domain in the route request.

      - Check that the given domain's transit policies do not preclude
        traffic generated by members of the source host set with the



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        specified user class and requested services, from flowing to the
        destination domain.

   During the computation of the requested routes, a route server also
   caches what it considers to be all feasible routes to intermediate
   destination domains, thus increasing the chances of being able to
   respond to a future route request without having to generate a new
   route.  The route server does perform some policy consistency checks
   on the routes, as they are generated, to intermediate destinations.
   However, these routes may not in fact be feasible; the transit
   domains contained on the routes may not permit traffic between the
   source and the given intermediate destinations.  Hence, before
   dispensing such a route in response to a route request, a route
   server must check that the transit policies of the constituent
   domains are consistent with the source and destination of the traffic
   flow.

6.2.  Route Directionality

   A path agent may wish to set up a bidirectional path using a route
   supplied by a route server.  (Refer to sections 7.2 and 7.4 for
   detailed discussions of path directionality.)  However, a route
   server can only guarantee that the routes it supplies are feasible if
   used in the direction from source to destination.  The reason is that
   the route server, which resides in the source or source proxy domain,
   does not have access to, and thus cannot account for, the source
   policies of the destination domain.  Nevertheless, the route server
   can provide the path agent with an indication of its assessment of
   route feasibility in the direction from destination to source.

   A necessary but insufficient condition for a route to be feasible in
   the direction from destination to source is as follows.  The route
   must be consistent, in the direction from destination to source, with
   the transit policies of the domains that compose the route.  The
   transit policy consistency checks performed by the route server
   during route generation account for the direction from source to
   destination but not for the direction from destination to source.
   Only after a route server generates a feasible route from source to
   destination does it perform the transit policy consistency checks for
   the route in the direction from destination to source.  Following
   these checks, the route server includes in its ROUTE RESPONSE message
   to the path agent an indication of its assessment of route
   feasibility in each direction.








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6.3.  Route Database

   A policy route, as originally specified by a route server, is an
   ordered list of virtual gateways, domains, and transit policies: VG 1
   - AD 1 - TP 1 - ... - VG n - AD n - TP n. where VG i is the virtual
   gateway that serves as exit from AD i-1 and entry to AD i, and TP i
   is the set of transit policies associated with AD i and relevant to
   the particular route.  Each route is indexed by source and
   destination domain.  Route servers and paths agents store policy
   routes in route databases maintained as caches whose entries must be
   periodically flushed to avoid retention of stale policy routes.  A
   route server's route database is the set of all routes it has
   generated on behalf of its domain as source or source proxy;
   associated with each route in the database are its route
   characteristics.  A path agent's route database is the set of all
   routes it has requested and received from route servers on behalf of
   hosts for which it is configured to act.

   When attempting to locate a feasible route for a traffic flow, a path
   agent first consults its own route database before querying a route
   server.  If the path agent's route database contains one or more
   routes between the given source and destination domains and
   accommodating the given host set and UCI, then the path agent checks
   each such route against the set of excluded domains listed in the
   source policy.  The path agent either selects the first route
   encountered that does not include the excluded domains, or, if no
   such route exists in its route database, requests a route from a
   route server.

   A path agent must query a route server for routes when it is unable
   to fulfill a route request from its own route database.  Moreover, we
   recommend that a path agent automatically forward to a route server,
   all route requests with non-null requested services.  The reason is
   that the path agent retains no route characteristics in its route
   database.  Hence, the path agent cannot determine whether an entry in
   its route database satisfies the requested services.

   When responding to a path agent's request for a policy route, a route
   server first consults its route database, unless the ROUTE REQUEST
   message contains an explicit directive to generate a new route.  If
   its route database contains one or more routes between the given
   source and destination domains and accommodating the given host set
   and UCI, the route server checks each such route against the set of
   excluded domains listed in the ROUTE REQUEST message.  The route
   server either selects all routes encountered that do not include the
   excluded domains, or, if no such route exists in its route database,
   attempts to generate such a route.  Once the route server selects a
   set of routes, it then checks each such route against the services



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   requested by the path agent and the services offered by the domains
   composing the route.  To obtain the offered services information, the
   route server consults its routing information database.  The route
   server either selects the first route encountered that is consistent
   with both the requested and offered services, or, if no such route
   exists in its route database, attempts to generate such a route.

6.3.1.  Cache Maintenance

   Each route stored in a route database has a maximum cache lifetime
   equal to rdb_rs minutes for a route server and rdb_ps minutes for a
   path agent.  Route servers and path agents reclaim cache space by
   flushing entries that have attained their maximum lifetimes.
   Moreover, paths agents reclaim cache space for routes whose paths
   have failed to be set up successfully or have been torn down (see
   section 7.4).

   Nevertheless, cache space may become scarce, even with reclamation of
   entries.  If a cache fills, the route server or path agent logs the
   event for network management.  To obtain space in the cache when the
   cache is full, the route server or path agent deletes from the cache
   the oldest entry.

7.  Path Control Protocol and Data Message Forwarding Procedure

   Two entities in different domains may exchange IDPR data messages,
   only if there exists an IDPR path set up between the two domains.
   Path setup requires cooperation among path agents and intermediate
   policy gateways.  Path agents locate policy routes, initiate the Path
   Control Protocol (PCP), and manage existing paths between
   administrative domains.  Intermediate policy gateways verify that a
   given policy route is consistent with their domains' transit
   policies, establish the forwarding information, and forward messages
   along existing paths.

   Each policy gateway and each route server contains a path agent.  The
   path agent that initiates path setup in the source or source proxy
   domain is the "originator", and the path agent that handles the
   originator's path setup message in the destination or destination
   proxy domain is the "target".  Every path has two possible directions
   of traffic flow: from originator to target and from target to
   originator.  Path control messages are free to travel in either
   direction, but data messages may be restricted to only one direction.

   Once a path for a policy route is set up, its physical realization is
   a set of consecutive policy gateways, with policy gateways or route
   servers forming the endpoints.  Two successive entities in this set
   belong to either the same domain or the same virtual gateway.  A



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   policy gateway or route server may, at any time, recover the
   resources dedicated to a path that goes through it by tearing down
   that path.  For example, a policy gateway may decide to tear down a
   path that has not been used for some period of time.

   PCP may build multiple paths between source and destination domains,
   but it is not responsible for managing such paths as a group or for
   eliminating redundant paths.

7.1.  An Example of Path Setup

   We illustrate how path setup works by stepping through an example.
   Suppose host Hx in domain AD X wants to communicate with host Hy in
   domain AD Y and that both AD X and AD Y support IDPR.  Hx need not
   know the identity of its own domain or of Hy's domain in order to
   send messages to Hy.  Instead, Hx simply forwards a message bound for
   Hy to one of the gateways on its local network, according to its
   local forwarding information only.  If the recipient gateway is a
   policy gateway, the resident path agent determines how to forward the
   message outside of the domain.  Otherwise, the recipient gateway
   forwards the message to another gateway in AD X, according to its
   local forwading information.  Eventually, the message will arrive at
   a policy gateway in AD X, as policy gateways are the only egress
   points to other domains, in domains that support IDPR.

   The path agent resident in the recipient policy gateway uses the
   message header, including source and destination addresses and any
   requested service information (for example, type of service), in
   order to determine whether it is an intra-domain or inter-domain
   message, and if inter-domain, whether it requires an IDPR policy
   route.  Specifically, the path agent attempts to locate a forwarding
   information database entry for the given traffic flow, from the
   information contained in the message header.  In the future, for IP
   messages, the relevant header information may also include special
   service-specific IP options or even information from higher layer
   protocols.

   Forwarding database entries exist for all of the following:

   - All intra-domain traffic flows.  Intra-domain forwarding
     information is integrated into the forwarding information database
     as soon as it is received.

   - Inter-domain traffic flows that do not require IDPR policy routes.
     Non-IDPR forwarding information is integrated into the forwarding
     database as soon as it is received.

   - IDPR inter-domain traffic flows for which a path has already been



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     set up.  IDPR forwarding information is integrated into the
     forwarding database only during path setup.

   The path agent uses the message header contents to guide the search
   for a forwarding information database entry for a given traffic flow.
   We recommend a radix search to locate such an entry.  When the search
   terminates, it produces either an entry, or, in the case of a new
   IDPR traffic flow, a directive to generate an entry.  If the search
   terminates in an existing forwarding information database entry, the
   path agent forwards the message according to that entry.

   Suppose that the search terminates indicating that the traffic flow
   from Hx to Hy requires an IDPR policy route and that no entry in the
   forwarding information database yet exists for that traffic flow.  In
   this case, the path agent first determines the source and destination
   domains associated with the message's source and destination
   addresses, before attempting to obtain a policy route.  The path
   agent relies on the mapping servers to supply the domain information,
   but it caches all mapping server responses locally to limit the
   number of future queries.  When attempting to resolve an address to a
   domain, the path agent always checks its local cache before
   contacting a mapping server.

   After obtaining the domain information, the path agent attempts to
   obtain a policy route to carry the traffic from Hx to Hy.  The path
   agent relies on route servers to supply policy routes, but it caches
   all route server responses locally to limit the number of future
   queries.  When attempting to locate a suitable policy route, the path
   agent usually consults its local cache before contacting a route
   server, as described previously in section 6.3.

   If no suitable cache entry exists, the path agent queries the route
   server, providing it with the source and destination domains together
   with source policy information carried in the host message or
   specified through configuration.  Upon receiving a policy route
   query, a route server consults its route database.  If it cannot
   locate a suitable route in its route database, the route server
   attempts to generate at least one route to AD Y, consistent with the
   requested services for Hx.

   The route server always returns a response to the path agent,
   regardless of whether it is successful in locating a suitable policy
   route.  The response to a successful route query consists of a set of
   candidate routes, from which the path agent makes its selection.  We
   expect that a path agent will normally choose a single route from a
   candidate set.  Nevertheless, IDPR does not preclude a path agent
   from selecting multiple routes from the candidate set.  A path agent
   may desire multiple routes to support features such as fault



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   tolerance or load balancing; however, IDPR does not currently specify
   how the path agent should use multiple routes.

   If the policy route is a new route provided by the route server,
   there will be no existing path for the route, and thus the path agent
   must set up such a path.  However, if the policy route is an existing
   route extracted from the path agent's cache, there may well be an
   existing path for the route, set up to accommodate a host traffic
   flow.  IDPR permits multiple traffic flows to use the same path,
   provided that all traffic flows sharing the path travel between the
   same endpoint domains and have the same service requirements.
   Nevertheless, IDPR does not preclude a path agent from setting up
   distinct paths along the same policy route to preserve the
   distinction between host traffic flows.

   The path agent associates an identifier with the path, which is
   included in each message that travels down the path and is used by
   the policy gateways along the path in order to determine how to
   forward the message.  If the path already exists, the path agent uses
   the preexisting identifier.  However, for new paths, the path agent
   chooses a path identifier that is different from those of all other
   paths that it manages.  The path agent also updates its forwarding
   information database to reference the path identifier and modifies
   its search procedure to yield the correct entry in the forwarding
   information database given the data message header.

   For new paths, the path agent initiates path setup, communicating the
   policy route, in terms of requested services, constituent domains,
   relevant transit policies, and the connecting virtual gateways, to
   policy gateways in intermediate domains.  Using this information, an
   intermediate policy gateway determines whether to accept or refuse
   the path and to which next policy gateway to forward the path setup
   information.  The path setup procedure allows policy gateways to set
   up a path in both directions simultaneously.  Each intermediate
   policy gateway, after path acceptance, updates its forwarding
   information database to include an entry that associates the path
   identifier with the appropriate previous and next hop policy
   gateways.

   When a policy gateway in AD Y accepts a path, it notifies the source
   path agent in AD X.  We expect that the source path agent will
   normally wait until a path has been successfully established before
   using it to transport data traffic.  However, PCP does not preclude a
   path agent from forwarding messages along a path prior to
   confirmation of successful path establishment.  Paths remain in place
   until they are torn down because of failure, expiration, or when
   resources are scarce, preemption in favor of other paths.




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   We note that data communication between Hx and Hy may occur over two
   separate IDPR paths: one from AD X to AD Y and one from AD Y to AD X.
   The reasons are that within a domain, hosts know nothing about path
   agents nor IDPR paths, and path agents know nothing about other path
   agents' existing IDPR paths.  Thus, in AD Y, the path agent that
   terminates the path from AD X may not be the same as the path agent
   that receives traffic from Hy destined for Hx.  In this case, receipt
   of traffic from Hy forces the second path agent to set up an
   independent path from AD Y to AD X.

7.2.  Path Identifiers

   Each path has an associated path identifier, unique throughout an
   internetwork.  Every IDPR data message travelling along that path
   includes the path identifier, used for message forwarding.  The path
   identifier is the concatenation of three items: the identifier of the
   originator's domain, the identifier of the originator's policy
   gateway or route server, and a 32-bit local path identifier specified
   by the originator.  The path identifier and the CMTP transaction
   identifier have analogous syntax and play analogous roles in their
   respective protocols.

   When issuing a new path identifier, the originator always assigns a
   local path identifier that is different from that of any other active
   or recently torn-down path originally set up by that path agent.
   This helps to distinguish new paths from replays.  Hence, the
   originator must keep a record of each extinct path for long enough
   that all policy gateways on the path will have eliminated any
   reference to it from their memories.  The right-most 30 bits of the
   local identifier are the same for each path direction, as they are
   assigned by the originator.  The left-most 2 bits of the local
   identifier indicate the path direction.

   At path setup time, the originator specifies which of the path
   directions to enable contingent upon the information received from
   the route server in the ROUTE RESPONSE message.  By "enable", we mean
   that each path agent and each intermediate policy gateway establishes
   an association between the path identifier and the previous and next
   policy gateways on the path, which it uses for forwarding data
   messages along that path.  IDPR data messages may travel in the
   enabled path directions only, but path control messages are always
   free to travel in either path direction.  The originator may enable
   neither path direction, if the entire data transaction can be carried
   in the path setup message itself.  In this case, the path agents and
   the intermediate policy gateways do not establish forwarding
   associations for the path, but they do verify consistency of the
   policy information contained in the path setup message, with their
   own transit policies, before forwarding the setup message on to the



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   next policy gateway.

   The path direction portion of the local path identifier has different
   interpretations, depending upon message type.  In an IDPR path setup
   message, the path direction indicates the directions in which the
   path should be enabled: the value 01 denotes originator to target,
   the value 10 denotes target to originator, the value 11 denotes both
   directions, and the value 00 denotes neither direction.  Each policy
   gateway along the path interprets the path direction in the setup
   message and sets up the forwarding information as directed.  In an
   IDPR data message, the path direction indicates the current direction
   of traffic flow: either 01 for originator to target or 10 for target
   to originator.  Thus, if for example, an originator sets up a path
   enabling only the direction from target to originator, the target
   sends data messages containing the path identifier selected by the
   originator together with the path direction set equal to 10.

   Instead of using path identifiers that are unique throughout an
   internetwork, we could have used path identifiers that are unique
   only between a pair of consecutive policy gateways and that change
   from one policy gateway pair to the next.  The advantage of locally
   unique path identifiers is that they may be much shorter than
   globally unique identifiers and hence consume less transmission
   bandwidth.  However, the disadvantage is that the path identifier
   carried in each IDPR data message must be modified at each policy
   gateway, and hence if the integrity/authentication information covers
   the path identifier, it must be recomputed at each policy gateway.
   For security reasons, we have chosen to include the path identifier
   in the set of information covered by the integrity/authentication
   value, and moreover, we advocate public-key based signatures for
   authentication.  Thus, it is not possible for intermediate policy
   gateways to modify the path identifier and then recompute the correct
   integrity/authentication value.  Therefore, we have decided in favor
   of path identifiers that do not change from hop to hop and hence must
   be globally unique.  To speed forwarding of IDPR data messages with
   long path identifiers, policy gateways should hash the path
   identifiers in order to index IDPR forwarding information.

7.3.  Path Control Messages

   Messages exchanged by the path control protocol are classified into
   "requests": SETUP, TEARDOWN, REPAIR; and "responses": ACCEPT, REFUSE,
   ERROR.  These messages have significance for intermediate policy
   gateways as well as for path agents.

   SETUP:
        Establishes a path by linking together pairs of policy gateways.
        The SETUP message is generated by the originator and propagates



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        to the target.  In response to a SETUP message, the originator
        expects to receive an ACCEPT, REFUSE, or ERROR message.  The
        SETUP message carries all information necessary to set up the
        path including path identifier, requested services, transit
        policy information relating to each domain traversed, and
        optionally, expedited data.

   ACCEPT: Signals successful path establishment.  The ACCEPT message is
        generated by the target, in response to a SETUP message, and
        propagates back to the originator.  Reception of an ACCEPT
        message by the originator indicates that the originator can now
        safely proceed to send data along the path.  The ACCEPT message
        contains the path identifier and an optional reason for
        conditional acceptance.

   REFUSE: Signals that the path could not be successfully established,
        either because resources were not available or because there was
        an inconsistency between the services requested by the source
        and the services offered by a transit domain along the path.
        The REFUSE message is generated by the target or by any
        intermediate policy gateway, in response to a SETUP message, and
        propagates back to the originator.  All recipients of a REFUSE
        message recover the resources dedicated to the given path.  The
        REFUSE message contains the path identifier and the reason for
        path refusal.

   TEARDOWN: Tears down a path, typically when a non-recoverable failure
        is detected.  The TEARDOWN message may be generated by any path
        agent or policy gateway in the path and usually propagates in
        both path directions.  All recipients of a TEARDOWN message
        recover the resources dedicated to the given path.  The TEARDOWN
        message contains the path identifier and the reason for path
        teardown.

   REPAIR: Establishes a repaired path by linking together pairs of
        policy gateways.  The REPAIR message is generated by a policy
        gateway after detecting that the next policy gateway on one of
        its existing paths is unreachable.  A policy gateway that
        generates a REPAIR message propagates the message forward at
        most one virtual gateway.  In response to a REPAIR message, the
        policy gateway expects to receive an ACCEPT, REFUSE, TEARDOWN,
        or ERROR message.  The REPAIR message carries the original SETUP
        message.

   ERROR: Transports information about a path error back to the
        originator, when a PCP message contains unrecognized
        information.  The ERROR message may be generated by the target
        or by any intermediate policy gateway and propagates back to the



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        originator.  Most, but not all, ERROR messages are generated in
        response to errors encountered during path setup.  The ERROR
        message includes the path identifier and an explanation of the
        error detected.

   Policy gateways use CMTP for reliable transport of PCP messages,
   between path agents and policy gateways and between consecutive
   policy gateways on a path.  PCP must communicate to CMTP the maximum
   number of transmissions per path control message, pcp_ret, and the
   interval between path contol message retransmissions, pcp_int
   microseconds.  All path control messages, except ERROR messages, may
   be transmitted up to pcp_ret times; ERROR messages are never
   retransmitted.  A path control message is "acceptable" if:

   - It passes the CMTP validation checks.

   - Its timestamp is less than pcp_old (300) seconds behind the
     recipient's internal clock time.

   - It carries a recognized path identifier, provided it is not a SETUP
     message.

   An intermediate policy gateway on a path forwards acceptable PCP
   messages.  As we describe in section 7.4 below, SETUP messages must
   undergo additional tests at each intermediate policy gateway prior to
   forwarding.  Moreover, receipt of an acceptable ACCEPT, REFUSE,
   TEARDOWN, or ERROR message at either path agent or at any
   intermediate policy gateway indirectly cancels any active local CMTP
   retransmissions of the original SETUP message.  When a path agent or
   intermediate policy gateway receives an unacceptable path control
   message, it discards the message and logs the event for network
   management.  The path control message age limit reduces the
   likelihood of denial of service attacks based on message replay.

7.4.  Setting Up and Tearing Down a Path

   Path setup begins when the originator generates a SETUP message
   containing:

   - The path identifier, including path directions to enable.

   - An indication of whether the message includes expedited data.

   -   The source user class identifier.

   - The requested services (see section 5.5.2) and source-specific
     information (see section 7.6.1) for the path.




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   - For each domain on the path, the domain component, applicable
     transit policies, and entry and exit virtual gateways.

   The only mandatory requested service is the maximum path lifetime,
   pth_lif, and the only mandatory source-specific information is the
   data message integrity/authentication type.  If these are not
   specified in the path setup message, each recipient policy gateway
   assigns them default values, (60) minutes for pth_lif and no
   authentication for integrity/authentication type.  Each path agent
   and intermediate policy gateway tears down a path when the path
   lifetime is exceeded.  Hence, no single source can indefinitely
   monopolize policy gateway resources or still functioning parts of
   partially broken paths.

   After generating the SETUP message and establishing the proper local
   forwarding information, the originator selects the next policy
   gateway on the path and forwards the SETUP message to the selected
   policy gateway.  The next policy gateway selection procedure,
   described below, applies when either the originator or an
   intermediate policy gateway is making the selection.  We have elected
   to describe the procedure from the perspective of a selecting
   intermediate policy gateway.

   The policy gateway selects the next policy gateway on a path, in
   round-robin order from its list of policy gateways contained in the
   present or next virtual gateway, as explained below.  In selecting
   the next policy gateway, the policy gateway uses information
   contained in the SETUP message and information provided by VGP and by
   the intra-domain routing procedure.

   If the selecting policy gateway is a domain entry point, the next
   policy gateway must be:

   - A member of the next virtual gateway listed in the SETUP message.

   - Reachable according to intra-domain routes supporting the transit
     policies listed in the SETUP message.

   - Able to reach, according to VGP, the next domain component listed
     in the SETUP message.

   In addition, the selecting policy gateway may use quality of service
   information supplied by intra-domain routing to resolve ties between
   otherwise equivalent next policy gateways in the same domain.  In
   particular, the selecting policy gateway may select the next policy
   gateway whose connecting intra-domain route is optimal according to
   the requested services listed in the SETUP message.




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   If the selecting policy gateway is a domain exit point, the next
   policy gateway must be:

   - A member of the current virtual gateway listed in the SETUP message
     (which is also the selecting policy gateway's virtual gateway).

   - Reachable according to VGP.

   - A member of the next domain component listed in the SETUP message.

   Once the originator or intermediate policy gateway selects a next
   policy gateway, it forwards the SETUP message to the selected policy
   gateway.  Each recipient (policy gateway or target) of an acceptable
   SETUP message performs several checks on the contents of the message,
   in order to determine whether to establish or reject the path.  We
   describe these checks in detail below from the perspective of a
   policy gateway as SETUP message recipient.

7.4.1.  Validating Path Identifiers

   The recipient of a SETUP message first checks the path identifier, to
   make sure that it does not correspond to that of an already existing
   or recently extinct path.  To detect replays, malicious or otherwise,
   path agents and policy gateways maintain a record of each path that
   they establish, for max{pth_lif, pcp_old} seconds.  If the path
   identifier and timestamp carried in the SETUP message match a stored
   path identifier and timestamp, the policy gateway considers the
   message to be a retransmission and does not forward the message.  If
   the path identifier carried in the SETUP message matches a stored
   path identifier but the two timestamps do not agree, the policy
   gateway abandons path setup, logs the event for network management,
   and returns an ERROR message to the originator via the previous
   policy gateway.

7.4.2.  Path Consistency with Configured Transit Policies

   Provided the path identifier in the SETUP message appears to be new,
   the policy gateway proceeds to determine whether the information
   contained within the SETUP message is consistent with the transit
   policies configured for its domain.  The policy gateway must locate
   the source and destination domains, the source host set and user
   class identifier, and the domain-specific information for its own
   domain, within the SETUP message, in order to evaluate path
   consistency.  If the policy gateway fails to recognize the source
   user class (or one or more of the requested services), it logs the
   event for network management but continues with path setup.  If the
   policy gateway fails to locate its domain within the SETUP message,
   it abandons path setup, logs the event for network management, and



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   returns an ERROR message to the originator via the previous policy
   gateway.  The originator responds by tearing down the path and
   subsequently removing the route from its cache.

   Once the policy gateway locates its domain-specific portion of the
   SETUP message, it may encounter the following problems with the
   contents:

   - The domain-specific portion lists a transit policy not configured
     for the domain.

   - The domain-specific portion lists a virtual gateway not configured
     for the domain.

   In each case, the policy gateway abandons path setup, logs the event
   for network management, and returns an ERROR message to the
   originator via the previous policy gateway.  These types of ERROR
   messages indicate to the originator that the route may have been
   generated using information from an out-of-date CONFIGURATION
   message.

   The originator reacts to the receipt of such an ERROR message as
   follows.  First, it tears down the path and removes the route from
   its cache.  Then, it issues to a route server a ROUTE REQUEST message
   containing a directive to refresh the routing information database,
   with the most recent CONFIGURATION message from the domain that
   issued the ERROR message, before generating a new route.

   Once it verifies that its domain-specific information in the SETUP
   message is recognizable, the policy gateway then checks that the
   information contained within the SETUP message is consistent with the
   transit policies configured for its domain.  A policy gateway at the
   entry to a domain checks path consistency in the direction from
   originator to target, if the enabled path directions include
   originator to target.  A policy gateway at the exit to a domain
   checks path consistency in the direction from target to originator,
   if the enabled path directions include target to originator.

   When evaluating the consistency of the path with the transit policies
   configured for the domain, the policy gateway may encounter any of
   the following problems with SETUP message contents:

   - A transit policy does not apply in the given direction between the
     virtual gateways listed in the SETUP message.

   - A transit policy denies access to traffic from the given host set
     between the source and destination domains listed in the SETUP
     message.



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   - A transit policy denies access to traffic from the source user
     class listed in the SETUP message.

   - A transit policy denies access to traffic at the current time.

   In each case, the policy gateway abandons path setup, logs the event
   for network management, and returns a REFUSE message to the
   originator via the previous policy gateway.  These types of REFUSE
   messages indicate to the originator that the route may have been
   generated using information from an out-of-date CONFIGURATION
   message.  The REFUSE message also serves to teardown the path.

   The originator reacts to the receipt of such a REFUSE message as
   follows. First, it removes the route from its cache.  Then, it issues
   to a route server a ROUTE REQUEST message containing a directive to
   refresh the routing information database, with the most recent
   CONFIGURATION message from the domain that issued the REFUSE message,
   before generating a new route.

7.4.3.  Path Consistency with Virtual Gateway Reachability

   Provided the information contained in the SETUP message is consistent
   with the transit policies configured for its domain, the policy
   gateway proceeds to determine whether the path is consistent with the
   reachability of the virtual gateway containing the potential next
   hop.  To determine virtual gateway reachability, the policy gateway
   uses information provided by VGP and by the intra-domain routing
   procedure.

   When evaluating the consistency of the path with virtual gateway
   reachability, the policy gateway may encounter any of the following
   problems:

   - The virtual gateway containing the potential next hop is down.

   - The virtual gateway containing the potential next hop is not
     reachable via any intra-domain routes supporting the transit
     policies listed in the SETUP message.

   - The next domain component listed in the SETUP message is not
     reachable.

   Each of these determinations is made from the perspective of a single
   policy gateway and may not reflect actual reachability.  In each
   case, the policy gateway encountering such a problem returns a REFUSE
   message to the previous policy gateway which then selects a different
   next policy gateway, in round-robin order, as described in
   previously.  If the policy gateway receives the same response from



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   all next policy gateways selected, it abandons path setup, logs the
   event for network management, and returns the REFUSE message to the
   originator via the previous policy gateway.  These types of REFUSE
   messages indicate to the originator that the route may have been
   generated using information from an out-of-date DYNAMIC message.  The
   REFUSE message also serves to teardown the path.

   The originator reacts to the receipt of such a REFUSE message as
   follows.  First, it removes the route from its cache.  Then, it
   issues to a route server a ROUTE REQUEST message containing a
   directive to refresh the routing information database, with the most
   recent DYNAMIC message from the domain that issued the REFUSE
   message, before generating a new route.

7.4.4.  Obtaining Resources

   Once the policy gateway determines that the SETUP message contents
   are consistent with the transit policies and virtual gateway
   reachability of its domain, it attempts to gain resources for the new
   path.  For this version of IDPR, path resources consist of memory in
   the local forwarding information database.  However, in the future,
   path resources may also include reserved link bandwidth.

   If the policy gateway does not have sufficient resources to establish
   the new path, it uses the following algorithm to determine whether to
   generate a REFUSE message for the new path or a TEARDOWN message for
   an existing path in favor of the new path.  There are two cases:


   - No paths have been idle for more than pcp_idle (300) seconds.  In
     this case, the policy gateway returns a REFUSE message to the
     previous policy gateway.  This policy gateway then tries to select
     a different next policy gateway, as described previously, provided
     the policy gateway that issued the REFUSE message was not the
     target. If the REFUSE message was issued by the target or if there
     is no available next policy gateway, the policy gateway returns
     the REFUSE message to the originator via the previous policy
     gateway and logs the event for network management.  The REFUSE
     message serves to tear down the path.

   - At least one path has been idle for more than pcp_idle seconds.  In
     this case, the policy gateway tears down an older path in order to
     accommodate the newer path and logs the event for network
     management.  Specifically, the policy gateway tears down the least
     recently used path among those that have been idle for longer than
     pcp_idle seconds, resolving ties by choosing the oldest such path.

   If the policy gateway has sufficient resources to establish the path,



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   it attempts to update its local forwarding information database with
   information about the path identifier, previous and next policy
   gateways on the path, and directions in which the path should be
   enabled for data traffic transport.

7.4.5  Target Response

   When an acceptable SETUP message successfully reaches an entry policy
   gateway in the destination or destination proxy domain, this policy
   gateway performs all of the SETUP message checks described in the
   above sections.  The policy gateway's path agent then becomes the
   target, provided no checks fail, unless there is an explicit target
   specified in the SETUP message.  For example, remote route servers
   act as originator and target during RSQP message exchanges (see
   section 5.2).  If the recipient policy gateway is not the target, it
   attempts to forward the SETUP message to the target along an intra-
   domain route.  However, if the target is not reachable via intra-
   domain routing, the policy gateway abandons path setup, logs the
   event for network management, and returns a REFUSE message to the
   originator via the previous policy gateway.  The REFUSE message
   serves to tear down the path.

   Once the SETUP message reaches the target, the target determines
   whether it has sufficient path resources.  The target generates an
   ACCEPT message, provided it has sufficient resources to establish the
   path.  Otherwise, it generates a REFUSE message.

   The target may choose to use the reverse path to transport data
   traffic to the source domain, if the enabled path directions include
   10 or 11.  However, the target must first verify the consistency of
   the reverse path with its own domain's configured transit policies,
   before sending data traffic over that path.

7.4.6.  Originator Response

   The originator expects to receive an ACCEPT, REFUSE, or ERROR message
   in response to a SETUP message and reacts as follows:

   - The originator receives an ACCEPT message, confirming successful
     path establishment.  To expedite data delivery, the originator may
     forward data messages along the path prior to receiving an ACCEPT
     message, with the understanding that there is no guarantee that the
     path actually exists.

   - The originator receives a REFUSE message or an ERROR message,
     implying that the path could not be successfully established.  In
     response, the originator attempts to set up a different path to the
     same destination, as long as the number of selected different paths



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     does not exceed setup_try (3).  If the originator is unsuccessful
     after setup_try attempts, it abandons path setup and logs the event
     for network management.

   - The originator fails to receive any response to the SETUP message
     within setup_int microseconds after transmission.  In this case,
     the originator attempts path setup using the same policy route and
     a new path identifier, as long as the number of path setup attempts
     using the same route does not exceed setup_ret (2).  If the
     originator fails to receive a response to a SETUP message after
     setup_ret attempts, it logs the event for network management and
     then proceeds as though it received a negative response, namely a
     REFUSE or an ERROR, to the SETUP message.  Specifically, it
     attempts to set up a different path to the same destination, or it
     abandons path setup altogether, depending on the value of
     setup_try.

7.4.7.  Path Life

   Once set up, a path does not live forever.  A path agent or policy
   gateway may tear down an existing path, provided any of the following
   conditions are true:

   - The maximum path lifetime (in minutes, bytes, or messages) has been
     exceeded at the originator, the target, or an intermediate policy
     gateway.  In each case, the IDPR entity detecting path expiration
     logs the event for network management and generates a TEARDOWN
     message as follows:

      o The originator path agent generates a TEARDOWN message for
        propagation toward the target.

      o The target path agent generates a TEARDOWN message for
        propagation toward the originator.

      o An intermediate policy gateway generates two TEARDOWN messages,
        one for propagation toward the originator and one for
        propagation toward the target.

   - The previous or next policy gateway becomes unreachable, across a
     virtual gateway or across a domain according to a given transit
     policy, and the path is not reparable.  In either case, the policy
     gateway detecting the reachability problem logs the event for
     network management and generates a TEARDOWN message as follows:

      o If the previous policy gateway is unreachable, an intermediate
        policy gateway generates a TEARDOWN message for propagation to
        the target.



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      o If the next policy gateway is unreachable, an intermediate
        policy gateway generates a TEARDOWN message for propagation to
        the originator.

   - All of the policy gateway's path resources are in use at the
     originator, the target, or an intermediate policy gateway, a new
     path requires resources, and the given existing path is expendable,
     according to the least recently used criterion discussed in section
     7.4.4 above.  In each case, the IDPR entity initiating path
     preemption logs the event for network management and generates a
     TEARDOWN message as follows:

      o The originator path agent generates a TEARDOWN message for
        propagation toward the originator.

      o The target path agent generates a TEARDOWN message for
        propagation toward the originator.

      o An intermediate policy gateway generates two TEARDOWN messages,
        one for propagation toward the originator and one for
        propagation toward the target.

   Path teardown at a path agent or policy gateway, whether initiated by
   one of the above events, by receipt of a TEARDOWN message, or by
   receipt of a REFUSE message during path setup (as discussed in the
   previous sections), results in the path agent or policy gateway
   releasing all resources devoted to both directions of the path.

7.5.  Path Failure and Recovery

   When a policy gateway fails, it may not be able to save information
   pertaining to its established paths.  Thus, when the policy gateway
   returns to service, it may have no recollection of the paths set up
   through it and hence may no longer be able to forward data messages
   along these paths.  We expect that when a policy gateway fails, it
   will usually be out of service for long enough that the up/down
   protocol and the intra-domain routing procedure can detect that the
   particular policy gateway is no longer reachable.  In this case,
   adjacent or neighbor policy gateways that have set up paths through
   the failed policy gateway and that have detected the failure, attempt
   local path repair (see section 7.5.2 below), and if unsuccessful,
   issue TEARDOWN messages for all affected paths.









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7.5.1.  Handling Implicit Path Failures

   Nevertheless, policy gateways along a path must be able to handle the
   case in which a policy gateway fails and subsequently returns to
   service without either the up/down protocol or the intra-domain
   routing procedure detecting the failure; we do not expect this event
   to occur often.  If the policy gateway, prior to failure, contained
   forwarding information for several established paths, it may now
   receive many IDPR data messages containing unrecognized path
   identifiers.  The policy gateway should alert the data sources that
   their paths through it are no longer viable.

   Policy gateways that receive IDPR data messages with unrecognized
   path identifiers take one of the following two actions, depending
   upon their past failure record:

   - The policy gateway has not failed in the past pg_up (24) hour
     period.  In this case, there are at least four possible reasons for
     the unrecognized path identifier in the data message:

      o The data message path identifier has been corrupted in a way
        that is not detectable by the integrity/authentication value, if
        one is present.

      o The policy gateway has experienced a memory error.

      o The policy gateway failed sometime during the life of the path
        and source sent no data on the path for a period of pg_up hours
        following the failure.  Although paths may persist for more than
        pg_up hours, we expect that they will also be used more
        frequently than once every pg_up hours.

      o The path was not successfully established, and the originator
        sent data messages down the path prior to receiving a response
        to its SETUP message.

      In all cases, the policy gateway discards the data message and
      logs the event for network management.

   - The policy gateway has failed at least once in the past pg_up hour
     period.  Thus, the policy gateway assumes that the unrecognized
     path identifier in the data message may be attributed to its
     failure.  In response to the data message, the policy gateway
     generates an ERROR message containing the unrecognized path
     identifier.  The policy gateway then sends the ERROR message back
     to the entity from which it received the data message, which should
     be equivalent to the previous policy gateway on the path.




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   When the previous policy gateway receives such an ERROR message, it
   decides whether the message is acceptable.  If the policy gateway
   does not recognize the path identifier contained in the ERROR
   message, it does not find the ERROR message acceptable and
   subsequently discards the message.  However, if the policy gateway
   does find the ERROR message acceptable, it then determines whether it
   has already received an ACCEPT message for the given path.  If the
   policy gateway has not received an ACCEPT message for that path, it
   discards the ERROR message and takes no further action.

   If the policy gateway has received an ACCEPT message for that path,
   it then attempts path repair, as described in section 7.5.2 below.
   Only if path repair is unsuccessful does the previous policy gateway
   generate a TEARDOWN message for the path and return it to the
   originator.  The TEARDOWN message includes the domain and virtual
   gateway containing the policy gateway that failed, which aids the
   originator in selecting a new path that does not include the domain
   containing the failed policy gateway.  This mechanism ensures that
   path agents quickly discover and recover from disrupted paths, while
   guarding against unwarranted path teardown.

7.5.2.  Local Path Repair

   Failure of one of more entities on a given path may render the path
   unusable.  If the failure is within a domain, IDPR relies on the
   intra-domain routing procedure to find an alternate route across the
   domain, which leaves the path unaffected.  If the failure is in a
   virtual gateway, policy gateways must bear the responsibility of
   repairing the path.  Policy gateways nearest to the failure are the
   first to recognize its existence and hence can react most quickly to
   repair the path.

   Relinquishing control over path repair to policy gateways in other
   domains may be unacceptable to some domain administrators.  The
   reason is that these policy gateways cannot guarantee construction of
   a path that satisfies the source policies of the source domain, as
   they have no knowledge of other domains' source policies.

   Nevertheless, limited local path repair is feasible, without
   distributing either source policy information throughout an
   internetwork or detailed path information among policy gateways in
   the same domain or in the same virtual gateway.  We say that a path
   is "locally reparable" if there exists an alternate route between two
   policy gateways, separated by at most one virtual gateway, on the
   path.  This definition covers path repair in the presence of failed
   routes between consecutive policy gateways as well as failed policy
   gateways themselves.




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   An IDPR entity attempts local repair of an established path, in the
   direction from originator to target, immediately after detecting that
   the next policy gateway on the path is no longer reachable.  To
   prevent multiple path repairs in response to the same failure, we
   have stipulated that path repair can only be initiated in the
   direction from originator to target.  The IDPR entity initiating
   local path repair attempts to find an alternate path to the policy
   gateway immediately following the unreachable policy gateway on the
   path.

   Local path repair minimizes the disruption of data traffic flow
   caused by certain types of failures along an established path.
   Specifically, local path repair can accommodate an individual failed
   policy gateway or failed direct connection between two adjacent
   policy gateways.  However, it can only be attempted through virtual
   gateways containing multiple peer policy gateways.  Local path repair
   is not designed to repair paths traversing failed virtual gateways or
   domain partitions.  Whenever local path repair is impossible, the
   failing path must be torn down.

7.5.3.  Repairing a Path

   When an IDPR entity detects through an ERROR message that the next
   policy gateway has no knowledge of a given path, it generates a
   REPAIR message and forwards it to the next policy gateway.  This
   REPAIR message will reestablish the path through the next policy
   gateway.

   When an entity detects that the next policy gateway on a path is no
   longer reachable, it takes one of the following actions, depending
   upon whether the entity is a member of the next policy gateway's
   virtual gateway.

   - If the entity is not a member of the next policy gateway's virtual
     gateway, then one of the following two conditions must be true:

      o The next policy gateway has a peer that is reachable via an
        intra-domain route consistent with the requested services.  In
        this case, the entity generates a REPAIR message containing the
        original SETUP message and forwards it to the next policy
        gateway's peer.

      o The next policy gateway has no peers that are reachable via
        intra-domain routes consistent with the requested services.  In
        this case, the entity tears down the path back to the
        originator.

   - If the entity is a member of the next policy gateway's virtual



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   gateway, then one of the following four conditions must be true:

      o The next policy gateway has a peer that belongs to the same
        domain component and is directly-connected to and reachable from
        the entity.  In this case, the entity generates a REPAIR message
        and forwards it to the next policy gateway's peer.

      o The next policy gateway has a peer that belongs to the same
        domain component, is not directly-connected to the entity, but
        is directly-connected to and reachable from one of the entity's
        peers, which in turn is reachable from the entity via an intra-
        domain route consistent with the requested services.  In this
        case, the entity generates a REPAIR message and forwards it to
        its peer.

      o The next policy gateway has no operational peers within its
        domain component, but is directly-connected to and reachable
        from one of the entity's peers, which in turn is reachable from
        the entity via an intra-domain route consistent with the
        requested services.  In this case, the entity generates a REPAIR
        message and forwards it to its peer.

      o The next policy gateway has no operational peers within its
        domain component, and the entity has no operational peers which
        are both reachable via intra-domain routes consistent with the
        requested services and directly-connected to and reachable from
        the next policy gateway.  In this case, the entity tears down
        the path back to the originator.

   A recipient of a REPAIR message takes the following steps, depending
   upon its relationship to the entity that issued the REPAIR message.

   - The recipient and the issuing entity are in the same domain or in
     same virtual gateway.  In this case, the recipient extracts the
     SETUP message contained within the REPAIR message and treats the
     message as it would any other SETUP message.  Specifically, the
     recipient checks consistency of the path with its domain's transit
     policies and virtual gateway reachability.  If there are
     unrecognized portions of the SETUP message, the recipient generates
     an ERROR message, and if there are path inconsistencies, the
     recipient generates a REFUSE message.  In either case, the
     recipient returns the corresponding message to the policy gateway
     from which it received the REPAIR message.  Otherwise, if the
     recipient accepts the REPAIR message, it updates its local
     forwarding information database accordingly and forwards the REPAIR
     message to a potential next policy gateway, according to the
     information contained in the enclosed SETUP message.




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   - The recipient and the issuing entity are in different domains and
     different virtual gateways.  In this case, the recipient extracts
     the SETUP message from the REPAIR message and determines whether
     the associated path matches any of its established paths.  If the
     path does not match an established path, the recipient generates a
     REFUSE message and returns it to the policy gateway from which it
     received the REPAIR message.  In response to the receipt of a
     REFUSE message, the policy gateway tries a different next policy
     gateway.

   The path is reparable, if a path match is discovered.  In this case,
   the recipient updates the path entry in the local forwarding
   information database and issues an ACCEPT message to the policy
   gateway from which it received the REPAIR message, which in turn
   returns the message to the entity that issued the REPAIR message.
   The path is irreparable if all potential next policy gateways have
   been exhausted and a path match has yet to be discovered.  In this
   case, the policy gateway that fails to locate a next policy gateway
   issues a TEARDOWN message to return to the originator.

   An IDPR entity expects to receive an ACCEPT, TEARDOWN, REFUSE, or
   ERROR message in response to a REPAIR message and reacts to these
   responses differently as follows:

   - The entity always returns a TEARDOWN message to the originator via
     previous policy gateway.

   - The entity does not return an ACCEPT message to the originator, but
     receipt of such a message indicates that the path has been
     successfully repaired.

   - The entity infers that the path is irreparable and subsequently
     tears down the path and logs the event for network management, upon
     receipt of a REFUSE or ERROR message or when no response to the
     REPAIR message arrives within setup_int microseconds.

   When an entity detects that the previous policy gateway on a path
   becomes unreachable, it expects to receive a REPAIR message within
   setup_wait microseconds.  If the entity does not receive a REPAIR
   message for the path within that time, it infers that the path is
   irreparable and subsequently tears down the path and logs the event
   for network management.

7.6.  Path Control Message Formats

   The path control protocol number is equal to 3.  We describe the
   contents of each type of PCP message below.




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7.6.1.  SETUP

   The SETUP message type is equal to 0.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            SRC AD             |            HST SET            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |      UCI      |    UNUSED     |            NUM RQS            |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            DST AD             |            TGT ENT            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            AD PTR             |
   +-------------------------------+
   For each requested service for the path:
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |            RQS TYP            |            RQS LEN            |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |                            RQS SRV                            |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
   For each domain contained in the path:
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |    AD LEN     |      VG       |            ADJ AD             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |            ADJ CMP            |            NUM TP             |
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |              TP               |
   +-------------------------------+

   PATH ID
        (64 bits) Path identifier consisting of the numeric identifier
        for the originator's domain (16 bits), the numeric identifier
        for the originator policy gateway or route server (16 bits), the
        path direction (2 bits), and the local path identifier (30
        bits).

   SRC AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the source domain, which may
        be different from the originator domain if the originator domain
        is a proxy for the source.

   HST SET (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the source's host set.

   UCI (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the source user class.  The value
        0 indicates that there is no particular source user class.



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   UNUSED (8 bits) Not currently used; must be set equal to 0.

   NUM RQS (16 bits) Number of requested services.

   DST AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the destination domain, which
        may be different from the target domain if the target domain is
        a proxy for the destination.

   TGT ENT (16 bits) Numeric identifier for the target entity.  A value
        of 0 indicates that there is no specific target entity.

   AD PTR (16 bits) Byte offset from the beginning of the message
        indicating the location of the beginning of the domain-specific
        information, contained in the right-most 15 bits.  The left-most
        bit indicates whether the message includes expedited data (1
        expedited data, 0 no expedited data).

   RQS TYP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a type of requested service
        or source-specific information.  Valid requested services are
        described in section 5.5.2.  Valid source source-specific
        information includes the following types:

        12.  MD4/RSA data message authentication (see [16]).

        13.  MD5/RSA data message authentication (see [17]).

        14.  Billing address (variable).

        15.  Charge number (variable).

   RQS LEN (16 bits) Length of the requested service or source-specific
        information, in bytes, beginning with the next field.

   RQS SRV (variable) Description of the requested service or source-
        specific information.

   AD LEN (8 bits) Length of the information associated with a
        particular domain on the route, in bytes, beginning with the
        next field.

   VG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for an exit virtual gateway.

   ADJ AD (16 bits) Numeric identifier for an adjacent domain.

   ADJ CMP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a component of the adjacent
        domain.  Used to aid a policy gateway in routing across a
        virtual gateway connected to a partitioned domain.




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   NUM TP (16 bits) Number of transit policies that apply to the section
        of the path traversing the given domain component.

   TP (16 bits) Numeric identifier for a transit policy.

7.6.2.  ACCEPT

   The ACCEPT message type is equal to 1.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |    RSN TYP    |                    REASON                     |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+

   PATH ID
        (64 bits) Path identifier contained in the original SETUP
        message.

   RSN TYP (optional, 8 bits) Numeric identifier for the reason for
        conditional path acceptance.

   REASON (optional, variable) Description of the reason for conditional
        path acceptance.  Currently, no reasons have been defined.

7.6.3  REFUSE

   The REFUSE message type is equal to 2.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |    RSN TYP    |                    REASON                     |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+

   PATH ID
        (64 bits) Path identifier contained in the original SETUP
        message.

   RSN TYP (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the reason for path refusal.

   REASON (variable) Description of the reason for path refusal.  Valid



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        reasons include the following types:


        1.  Transit policy does not apply between the virtual gateways in a
            given direction.  Numeric identifier for the transit policy (16
            bits).

        2.  Transit policy denies access to traffic from the host set between
            the source and destination domains.  Numeric identifier for the
            transit policy (16 bits).

        3.  Transit policy denies access to traffic from the source user
            class.  Numeric identifier for the transit policy (16 bits).

        4.  Transit policy denies access to traffic at the current time.
            Numeric identifier for the transit policy (16 bits).

        5.  Virtual gateway is down.  Numeric identifier for the virtual
            gateway (8 bits) and associated adjacent domain (16 bits).

        6.  Virtual gateway is not reachable according to the given transit
            policy.  Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway (8 bits),
            associated adjacent domain (16 bits), and transit policy (16
            bits).

        7.  Domain component is not reachable.  Numeric identifier for the
            domain (16 bits) and the component (16 bits).

        8.  Insufficient resources to establish the path.

        9.  Target is not reachable via intra-domain routing.

        10. No existing path with the given path identifier, in response to
            a REPAIR message only.

7.6.4.  TEARDOWN

   The TEARDOWN message type is equal to 3.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |    RSN TYP    |                    REASON                     |
   +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+




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   PATH ID
        (64 bits) Path identifier contained in the original SETUP
        message.

   RSN TYP (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the reason for path teardown.

   REASON (variable) Description of the reason for path teardown. Valid
        reasons include the following types:

   1.  Virtual gateway is down.  Numeric identifier for the virtual
       gateway (8 bits) and associated adjacent domain (16 bits).

   2.  Virtual gateway is not reachable according to the given transit
       policy.  Numeric identifier for the virtual gateway (8 bits),
       associated adjacent domain (16 bits), and transit policy (16
       bits).

   3.  Domain component is not reachable.  Numeric identifier for the
       domain (16 bits) and the component (16 bits).

   4.  Maximum path lifetime exceeded.

   5.  Preempted path.

   6.  Unable to repair path.

7.6.5.  ERROR

   The ERROR message type is equal to 4.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            PATH ID                            |
   |                                                               |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
   |      MSG      |    RSN TYP    |            REASON             |
   +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+

   PATH ID
        (64 bits) Path identifier contained in the path control or data
        message in error.

   MSG (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the type of path control message
        in error.  This field is ignored for error type 5.

   RSN TYP (8 bits) Numeric identifier for the reason for the PCP
        message error.



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   REASON (variable) Description of the reason for the PCP message
        error.  Valid reasons include the following types:

   1.   Path identifier is already currently active.

   2.   Domain does not appear in the SETUP message.

   3.   Transit policy is not configured for the domain.  Numeric
   identifer for
        the transit policy (16 bits).

   4.   Virtual gateway not configured for the domain.  Numeric
   identifier
        for the virtual gateway (8 bits) and associated adjacent domain
   (16
        bits).

   5.   Unrecognized path identifier in an IDPR data message.

7.6.6.  REPAIR

   The REPAIR message type is equal to 5.  A REPAIR message contains the
   original SETUP message only.

7.6.7.  Negative Acknowledgements

   When a policy gateway receives an unacceptable PCP message that
   passes the CMTP validation checks, it includes, in its CMTP ACK, an
   appropriate negative acknowledgement.  This information is placed in
   the INFORM field of the CMTP ACK (described previously in section
   2.4); the numeric identifier for each type of PCP negative
   acknowledgement is contained in the left-most 8 bits of the INFORM
   field.  Negative acknowledgements associated with PCP include the
   following types:

   1.  Unrecognized PCP message type.  Numeric identifier for the
       unrecognized message type (8 bits).

   2.  Out-of-date PCP message.

   3.  Unrecognized path identifier (for all PCP messages except SETUP).
       Numeric identifier for the unrecognized path (64 bits).

8.  Security Considerations

   Refer to sections 1.6, 1.7, and 2.3 for details on security in IDPR.





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RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993


9.  Author's Address

   Martha Steenstrup
   BBN Systems and Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge, MA 02138

   Phone: (617) 873-3192
   Email: msteenst@bbn.com

References

   [1]  Clark, D., "Policy Routing in Internet Protocols", RFC 1102, May
        1989.

   [2]  Estrin, D., "Requirements for Policy Based Routing in the
        Research Internet", RFC 1125, November 1989.

   [3]  Little, M., "Goals and Functional Requirements for Inter-
        Autonomous System Routing", RFC 1126, July 1989.

   [4]  Breslau, L. and Estrin, D., "Design of Inter-Administrative
        Domain Routing Protocols", Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '90
        Symposium, September 1990.

   [5]  Steenstrup, M., "An Architecture for Inter-Domain Policy Rout-
        ing", RFC 1478, July 1993.

   [6]  Austein, R., "DNS Support for IDPR", Work in Progress, March
        1993.

   [7]  Bowns, H. and Steenstrup, M., "Inter-Domain Policy Routing Con-
        figuration and Usage", Work in Progress, July 1991.

   [8]  Woodburn, R., "Definitions of Managed Objects for Inter-Domain
        Policy Routing (Version 1)", Work in Progress, March 1993.

   [9]  McQuillan, J., Richer, I., Rosen, E., and Bertsekas, D.,
        "ARPANET Routing Algorithm Improvements: Second Semiannual
        Technical Report", BBN Report No. 3940, October 1978.

   [10] Moy, J., "The OSPF Specification", RFC 1131, October 1989.

   [11] Oran, D. (editor), "Intermediate System to Intermediate System
        Routeing Exchange Protocol for Use in Conjunction with the Pro-
        tocol for Providing the Connectionless-mode Network Service (ISO
        8473)", ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6/WG2, October 1989.




Steenstrup                                                    [Page 107]

RFC 1479                     IDPR Protocol                     July 1993


   [12] Estrin, D., and Tsudik, G., "Secure Control of Transit Internet-
        work Traffic, TR-89-15, Computer Science Department, University
        of Southern California.

   [13] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
        Part I - Message Encipherment and Authentication Procedures",
        RFC 1113, August 1989.

   [14] Kent, S., and Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Elec-
        tronic Mail: Part II - Certificate-based Key Management", RFC
        1114, August 1989.

   [15] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
        Part III - Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers", RFC 1115, August
        1989.

   [16] Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, April
        1992.

   [17] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April
        1992.






























Steenstrup                                                    [Page 108]
